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requirements for the Degree of Master of Commerce and Management 
Abstract 
Ownership concentration, state ownership and firm performance: 
Empirical evidence from the Vietnamese stock market 
by 
Lai Trung Hoang 
This study examines the effects of ownership structure on firm performance in the Vietnamese stock 
market using a sample of 76 manufacturing companies listed on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange 
(HOSE) during 2007-2015. Firm performance is measured by Tobin’s Q, and ownership structure is 
investigated in three different aspects: managerial ownership, block ownership and state ownership. 
Descriptive statistics reveal a significantly concentrated ownership structure in the manufacturing 
companies listed on the HOSE. In each company, the largest owner on average owns 40% of its total 
shares, which is nearly three times higher than that of the second largest. Executive managers on 
average hold around 15% of firm shares, of which the majority belongs to the Board of Directors. State 
ownership is at a moderate level of 20% on average, but it varies significantly across companies as well 
as through time. 
Given multiple sources of the endogeneity of ownership structure, instead of traditional OLS and Fixed-
Effects, the well-developed system-GMM estimator is employed to examine the effects of ownership 
structure on firm performance. Empirical results show a cubic relationship between managerial 
ownership and Tobin’s Q, i.e. positive at low and high levels of managerial ownership and negative at 
the middle level, while block ownership has no impact on firm performance. It implies that internal 
managerial incentives play a more important role than external monitoring from outside shareholders 
in improving corporate governance quality. It also indicates that to increase firm performance, 
shareholders in general and blockholders in particular, should monitor more closely and be involved 
more actively in the day-to-day operations of the firm, or even engage directly in corporate governance 
by undertaking positions in management teams. On the other hand, an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between state ownership and Tobin’s Q is discovered, indicating that partial privatization could be an 
efficient way to improve firms’ financial performance. 
Keywords: firm performance, ownership structure, managerial ownership, block ownership, state 
ownership, corporate governance. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The question of how to improve firm performance has long been a question of interest for both 
researchers and practitioners. In finance literature, it has been widely accepted that the ultimate goal 
of a firm is maximizing shareholders’ wealth, which can be reflected in the market stock price. 
Meanwhile firm performance significantly affects the variance of stock returns, especially in the long 
term (Fama, 1990; Fama & French, 1988; Sivakumar & Waymire, 1993). On the other hand, from a 
macroeconomics perspective, performance reflects firms’ efficiency in utilizing scarce resources to 
produce outcomes. Thus, sustainable high-performing firms are desirable as they can attract new 
investments, as well as reflect a healthy economy in general. As a result, factors affecting firm 
performance have long been sought by researchers. Among these factors, ownership structure is 
specified in the literature as a possible candidate. In a flat world nowadays, through open transactions 
on stock markets, almost all market participants (including domestic and foreign individuals, 
institutions and governments) could become companies’ owners. Distinctions in nature among these 
types of owners and among their relationships with the companies lead to differences in their 
behavior, motivation and expectations, as well as the way they exploit their owner positions. Thus, 
how and to what extent ownership structure could affect firm performance are worthy matters of 
debate. 
In its relationship with firm performance, ownership structure is usually studied in two distinct aspects: 
ownership concentration and ownership identity. The ways that firms’ ownership concentration 
affects their performance are well explained in the notable agency theory developed by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). The preliminary idea of the agency theory could be traced back to Berle and Means 
(1932), who long ago predicted that in the modern corporation model, the separation of ownership 
and control in companies would lead to the agency problem (also called the principal-agent problem). 
In those companies, non-operating owners usually hold a significant proportion of firm shares, while 
managers who directly operate the firm own a much smaller part. As a result, the latter have 
opportunities and incentives to exploit firms’ resources to satisfy their own interest, which could harm 
that of the former. Resolving this conflict is a central issue for corporate governance. It is possible that 
these “selfish” motivations of managers could be limited by the monitoring activities of outside 
shareholders. However, while outside shareholders are numerous and dispersed, these mechanisms 
could be inefficient because “everybody’s business is nobody’s business”. This is formally called the 
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free rider problem. While monitoring shareholders have to bear related costs, non-monitoring owners 
(who are “free riders”) could also benefit from the former’s activities, but at no expense. Perceiving 
this fact, monitoring owners have incentives to give up their tasks to become “free riders”. 
Consequently, the supervision from outside shareholders on managers could be weakened. 
A highly concentrated ownership structure could alleviate both the agency problem and the free rider 
problem because it assists to align the interest of managers and that of outside shareholders, as well 
as to increase the efficiency of monitoring mechanisms. In the literature, two common measures of 
ownership concentration are the fractions of shares owned by the largest shareholders (block 
ownership) and by the top managers (managerial ownership1). Because the largest shareholders can 
affect firm strategies and operations through their significant voting rights and controlling power over 
the company’s management team, block ownership represents the ability and motivation of 
shareholders in monitoring managers’ activities (external pressure). Meanwhile, managerial 
ownership reflects the inside incentives of the management team itself in operating the firm effectively 
(internal motivation). However, it should be noted that external pressures and internal motivations 
are not necessarily separated, for example in the case that the largest shareholders are also managers. 
High ownership concentration increases both external pressure and internal motivation, thus it is 
expected to positively impact firm performance. 
Another commonly investigated aspect of ownership structure is ownership identity. Each type of 
shareholders (state, institution, foreigner, family or individual etc.) has distinct characteristics, roles 
and positions in the market, which lead to different ways in which they might affect the company. 
Among these mentioned entities, state ownership has attracted significant concern. Since the 
development of Keynesian economics, it has been widely agreed that the governments should play an 
important role in economic stabilization and development as well as public welfare, not only via their 
public policies but also through financial interventions (Keynes, 2007). While state ownership in 
companies is considered a type of government intervention, how it affects firm performance certainly 
becomes a question of interest. Furthermore, the last few decades have witnessed the collapse of 
socialist economies which only approved state ownership and at the same time attempted to limit 
private ownership. The collapse was followed by a tidal wave of privatization in transition economies 
of the former Soviet Union and Western Europe. Although the efficiency of these privatization 
programs is inconclusive, it is widely accepted that, from a financial perspective, state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) normally perform worse than their private counterparts. The failure could be 
explained by the dual principal-agent problem in SOEs: managers are agents of the state in the daily 
decision making process, but the state in turn is an agent of public properties’ “true” owners: the voting 
                                                          
1 The term managerial ownership is normally used interchangeably with insider ownership or board ownership 
(De Miguel, Pindado, & De la Torre, 2004; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Westman, 2011, among others). 
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population (Yarrow, King, Mairesse, & Melitz, 1986). As those “true” owners are extremely diffuse, the 
free rider problem in SOEs may become more severe than in private companies. This potentially leads 
to the inefficiency of the former compared to the latter. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Along with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and its centrally planned socialist economic model, 
Vietnam has been carrying out some reforms toward a market-oriented economy since 1986, such as 
the approval of private capital ownership, private land use or some free-traded markets. Private 
ownership permission facilitated the launch of various types of companies other than the previous 
fully state-owned model. The establishment of the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) in 2002 and 
the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) in 2005 allowed listed stocks to be traded officially on centralized 
stock markets. Although the ownership structure of Vietnamese companies has been changed 
considerably since then, ownership concentration and state ownership currently are still significantly 
high, even in listed companies, because of market immaturity. While most theories and empirical 
evidence on the impacts of ownership structure (particularly ownership concentration) on firm 
performance are explored based on the conditions of well-developed economies of the U.S. and 
European countries where firm ownership is highly dispersed, there is a lack of research focusing on 
emerging countries with a highly concentrated ownership structure. Thus, this study attempts to fill 
the gap by examining a sample of manufacturing companies listed on the HOSE. To the best of my 
knowledge, there has been no prior study investigating the effects of ownership concentration on firm 
performance in Vietnam. In addition, as discussed in Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), the endogeneity of ownership structure should be taken into 
consideration when studying its relationship with firm performance. Unfortunately, many studies 
especially in emerging countries have ignored this issue, leading to potential bias in their estimations. 
This study overcomes this problem by applying an advanced technique of Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) to control for both simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity, which are 
considered two main sources of the endogeneity of ownership structure (Himmelberg, Hubbard, & 
Palia, 1999). In addition, the GMM is also able to control for the dynamic endogeneity, which is another 
problem arising in a panel data set (Nickell, 1981). 
Furthermore, some prior studies showed that the relationship between state ownership and firm 
performance in Vietnamese companies could be negative (Tran, Nonneman, & Jorissen, 2014) or 
inverted U-shaped (Phung & Hoang, 2013). However, traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) and Fixed 
Effects estimators used in these studies could suffer from problems arising from endogeneity, serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity. In this study, the use of an updated dataset and the GMM estimator 
could improve the validity of the empirical results. 
4 
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
This study aims to identify relationships between ownership concentration as well as state ownership 
and firm performance in the Vietnamese stock market by examining a sample of manufacturing firms 
listed on the HOSE during 2007-2015. In addition, the study also investigates the effects of other firm-
specific characteristics on firm performance. The results are expected to shed more light on practical 
corporate governance as well as to assist firms to improve their performance. 
Specifically, the objectives of this study are to: 
1. Examine the impacts of ownership concentration, including block ownership and managerial 
ownership, on firm performance in the Vietnamese stock market. 
2. Examine the effects of state ownership on firm performance in the Vietnamese stock market. 
3. Examine the effects of firm-specific characteristics, including firm size, leverage, growth opportunity, 
market risk and firm age, on firm performance in the context of Vietnam. 
1.4 Significance of the study 
First, this is a pioneer study investigating in detail the ownership concentration of Vietnamese 
companies, particularly manufacturing companies listed on the HOSE, as well as its impacts on firm 
performance. Whilst prior studies on ownership structure structure in Vietnam mainly focused on the 
effects of state ownership or foreign ownership, the wide range of ownership concentration from very 
concentrated to very diffuse in Vietnamese companies calls for the importance of investigating its roles 
on firm performance improvement. Second, this study also re-examines impacts of state ownership 
on firm performance by employing an updated data set. Finally, the commonly-ignored endogeneity 
problem is taken into consideration by using the advanced estimation technique of GMM, which 
promises more valid empirical results. 
1.5 Structure of the study 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the relationship 
between ownership concentration, state ownership and firm performance, as well as providing a brief 
overview of the stock market and corporate governance structure in Vietnam. Data and methodology 
are presented in Chapter 3, followed by the empirical results in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 summarizes the 
main findings and their policy implications and then suggests some promising future research based 
on the study’s limitations. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
Section 2.1 briefly reviews the agency theory - the central theory explaining the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance. The theoretical frameworks and empirical evidence on the 
impacts of ownership concentration and state ownership on firm performance are presented and 
discussed in Section 2.2 and Section 2.3 respectively. Hypotheses employed in this study are proposed 
in Section 2.4. In addition to the related literature, Section 2.5 provides an overview of the Vietnamese 
stock market, followed by the introduction of a typical corporate governance model in the Vietnamese 
listed companies in Section 2.6. 
2.1 Agency theory 
Initial ideas of the agency problem were formed in the ground-breaking study of Berle and Means 
(1932), and were then developed into the so-called agency theory by the many other authors, such as 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen (1986) . The agency 
theory deals with the principal-agent relationship between owners (the principals) and managers (the 
agents) of a company. In the simplest form of business organization, i.e. sole proprietorship, ownership 
and management are identical, as the owner is simultaneously the manager. However, in the early 
twentieth century, Berle and Means (1932) predicted that the continuing growth of the economy 
would lead to the rise of large corporations, which would have the significant competitive advantage 
of economies of scale over small companies. To finance their activities, these large firms require 
enormous financial resources that one or several owners cannot afford because of financial 
constraints. This fact has led to the emergence of modern corporate models (e.g. public companies), 
in which firm equity is contributed by numerous owners. In such companies, managers are no longer 
sole owners; there are numerous outside shareholders who do not directly operate companies on a 
daily basis. In an extreme case, “pure” managers do not own any firm shares. Thus, managers could be 
considered agents of shareholders; they are paid to act on the shareholders’ behalf to operate the 
firms with the proposed mission of serving the shareholders’ interest. However, because managers’ 
shares in the companies are normally negligible and the interest of owners and managers may conflict, 
the mission may be not (and in practice usually is not) fully carried out. According to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), the separation of ownership and control facilitates managers’ incentives and 
opportunities to exploit firm resources to satisfy their own interest rather than that of owners. This 
problem is commonly known as the agency problem. In a highly dispersed ownership structure, owners 
are more likely to lose controlling power over the companies to managers and thus fail to monitor 
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them effectively, and managers may have more room to act in their own self-interest. Thus, it is 
expected that the more dispersed the ownership structure, the more severe the agency problem. 
The main presumption of the agency problem is the presence of information asymmetry between firm 
owners and managers (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Acting as decision makers in the daily operations of the 
company, the managers should know more about the firm than outside owners do. Therefore, the 
managers could utilize this inside information for their own benefit at other owners’ expense, in forms 
both pecuniary and non-pecuniary. On the other hand, the severity of the information asymmetry 
increases with the level of dispersion of the ownership structure. The main reason is the well-known 
free rider problem: owners who do not gather information and look after the firm could freely benefit 
from those who do. Small shareholders generally lack expertise and incentives to reduce the 
information gap since potential benefits could not offset the corresponding costs they have to bear 
(Yammeesri, 2003). Therefore, they have stronger motivation than large shareholders to become “free 
riders”, rather than taking the initiative of gathering information and monitoring companies. Thus, in 
a dispersed ownership structure where there is a lack of large shareholders, the free rider problem 
could become more severe, leading to a worse agency problem and higher agency costs. 
The emerging costs associated with the agency problem are called agency costs. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) stated that there are three components of agency costs, including (i) monitoring cost - 
expenditure by owners to establish appropriate monitoring mechanisms over managers in order to 
ensure that the latter’s activities align with the former’s interest, (ii) bonding cost - compensation for 
managers to decrease their exploitation incentive, and (iii) residual loss - the gap between the 
theoretical optimal value of owners (if the agency problem does not exist) and their realized value. 
However, because these aspects are difficult to observe or estimate (especially the residual loss), in 
current literature there is no way to measure the agency costs of the firm directly. Instead, proxy 
variables such as operating cost, free cash flow to the firm or total asset turnover, are normally used 
(Wang, 2010). 
The agency problem is undeniable, as long as ownership and control are separated. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) stated that the agency problem is a result of the inevitable imperfection of the principal-agent 
contract between owners and managers. A function of this contract is to specify what managers are 
allowed to do in serving owners’ best interest in various future circumstances. Unfortunately, because 
these contingencies are usually not possible to be predicted, there are a number of situations that 
require ex ante agreements on who would have rights to make decisions, which are called residual 
control rights (Grossman & Hart, 1986). Obviously, it is very unlikely that owners will take these 
residual control rights, because they “are not qualified or informed enough to decide what to do – the 
very reason they hired the manager in the first place” (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997, p. 741). Therefore, 
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these substantial residual control rights are in the hands of managers, leaving them much room to 
freely act in their own self-interest. 
Although the agency theory was originally developed based on conflicts between owners and 
managers within a joint stock company, its concept could be extended to the context of SOEs. Although 
state shares seem to be owned by the government, they essentially belong to the true owners: the 
voting population (Yarrow et al., 1986). Thus, the agency problem could also arise from the relationship 
between the voting population and politicians, who act as the voting population’s representatives in 
managing state ownership. Therefore, politicians could take advantage of their positions to exploit 
public resources to serve their own self-interest. As the voting population is very diffuse, the free rider 
problem and the inefficiency of monitoring mechanisms become extremely severe. 
In conclusion, the agency problem is undeniable in the modern corporate model, especially in publicly-
held companies. Given the commonly accepted assumption that the ultimate incentive of firm owners 
is value maximization, the agency problem is expected to negatively affect firm value. Thus, although 
public companies have competitive advantages of specialization and economies of scale, the agency 
problem is a factor offsetting these advantages. Thus, limiting the drawbacks of the agency problem 
could be an effective way to promote firm performance. 
2.2 Ownership concentration and firm performance 
In the literature, there are two common measurements of ownership concentration in a company: (i) 
the percentage of shares owned by the firm’s most significant shareholders and (ii) the percentage of 
shares owned by the management team, including board members, the CEO and top managers 
(Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). These two measurements reflect two different aspects of the agency 
problem. The former represents the shareholders’ ability and motivation in monitoring and supervising 
managers, meanwhile the latter is a proxy for the inner incentive of the management team itself in 
operating the firm effectively. Thus, there are some differences in the expected relationships between 
the two measurements of ownership concentration and firm performance. 
2.2.1 Block ownership and firm performance 
Monitoring hypothesis 
An important implication of the agency theory is that the agency problem will be less severe if firm 
ownership structure is more concentrated, and the agency costs are equal to zero if the owner is 
simultaneously the manager, as in the sole proprietorship. On the other hand, in a dispersed ownership 
structure, the insignificant fraction of shares owned by each principal weakens their power and 
incentive in controlling and monitoring the management team. Therefore, significant controlling 
8 
 
power over the firm is in the hands of managers. In addition, because of the free rider problem, small 
shareholders are less interested in carrying out these monitoring activities. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
stated that monitoring owners have to bear 100% of the cost, but only receive λ % of total benefit that 
is commensurate with λ % of the total equity they own. The more diffuse the ownership structure, the 
smaller the λ for each owner. As a result, shareholders find it expensive to take responsibility for 
monitoring since the benefits cannot offset the associated costs. Consequently, every owner has an 
incentive to become a “free rider”, who can benefit from other shareholders’ monitoring activities, 
instead of taking the responsibility for looking after the company. 
A possible solution to the free rider problem is that all shareholders agree to pay the monitoring costs. 
Practically, this idea has been applied through the appointment of the Board of Directors and in some 
countries, the Supervisory Board. These boards get paid by shareholders to monitor operations of 
professional managers, as well as to supervise one another. However, the paradox is that Directors 
and Supervisory Board members are also the agents of shareholders in monitoring executive 
managers. Given the small percentage of shares in a highly dispersed ownership structure, the 
controlling power makes Directors’ and Supervisory Board members’ incentive more likely to align with 
executive managers’ (for example the CEO’s) rather than outside shareholders’. Thus in practice, 
researchers usually categorize these board members’ shares as managerial ownership, along with that 
of the CEO and top managers (for example Demsetz and Villalonga (2001); Kapopoulos and Lazaretou 
(2007); Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), among others).  
These arguments imply that the lack of large owners in the firm could result in a decrease in monitoring 
incentive and efficiency. In contrast, in a highly concentrated ownership structure, closer monitoring 
mechanisms can be carried out by significant shareholders, resulting in a better performance of the 
managers in terms of serving the owners’ interest. This expectation is commonly called the monitoring 
hypothesis. 
Expropriation hypothesis 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) stated that the agency problem could also exist among shareholders. If one 
(or some) shareholder owns enough share to be a controlling shareholder, he/she could have strong 
influence on the management team, and thus on the firm’s strategies and daily operations. Therefore, 
it is possible for the controlling shareholder to abuse that power to serve their own self-benefit, which 
may conflict with that of minority shareholders. This private benefit of control could be in pecuniary 
forms (for example, higher-than-deserved salaries and personal consumption of blockholders at the 
firm’s expense) or non-pecuniary forms (for example, unfair related party transactions, i.e. selling the 
firm’s products to companies owned by the controlling shareholder at a lower-than-market price 
and/or buying at a higher-than-market price) (Barclay & Holderness, 1989). In these cases, firm 
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resources are distributed inefficiently to benefit controlling shareholder(s) but not minority 
shareholders. These arguments form the expropriation hypothesis, which predicts that higher 
ownership concentration could lead to lower firm performance. For example, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) reported a case in which the controlling shareholder of DWG Victor Posner received over 8 
million USD in salary in 1985 while his company was losing money. La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (2002) in their investigation of 27 wealthy economies found that the better the protection 
of minority shareholders against blockholders, the higher the firm value. A meaningful inference is that 
in transition economies where legal protection is poorly developed, the expropriation of minority 
shareholders could be a severe problem, which could offset the positive effects of blockholders’ 
monitoring incentives. 
2.2.2 Managerial ownership 
Convergence-of-interest hypothesis 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), in the modern corporation model, managers usually hold 
the power of controlling and operating firms but do not own significant shares. Consequently, they 
naturally tend to take advantage of their positions to exploit owners, i.e. using companies’ resources 
to maximize their own self-interest which conflicts with that of shareholders. Ceteris paribus, the 
smaller the fraction of equity the managers hold, the higher the motivation for them to do so, as their 
private benefit/cost ratio increases. Thus, the agency theory predicts that, in an extreme case of pure 
professional managers, i.e. the managers do not own any firm shares, the divergence of interest 
between the managers and shareholders becomes most severe. On the contrary, unlike the case of 
the largest shareholders who provide external monitoring, the rise in managers’ shares increases their 
internal incentives in serving non-manager shareholders’ interest. In this circumstance, managers are 
also significant shareholders, thus their benefit from the increase in firm value is more converged with 
that of other owners. As a result, the convergence-of-interest hypothesis predicts that managerial 
ownership positively affects firm performance. 
Entrenchment hypothesis 
The convergence-of-interest hypothesis implies that with regard to firm performance, the sole 
proprietorship model should outperform others, ceteris paribus. However, the fact is that, in spite of 
the above-mentioned disadvantages of the dispersed ownership structure, in practice this corporate 
model is still surviving well and becoming prominent in the financial market. This may be partly 
attributed to the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms, which could mitigate these 
disadvantages. Fama (1980) stated that even if managers hold only insignificant shares and thus have 
little internal incentive in acting as perfect decision making agents of firm owners, a competitive 
market could provide efficient monitoring mechanisms other than that of shareholders. The most 
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prominent mechanism among them could be the managerial labor market and the threat of takeover. 
In a competitive managerial labor market, a firm can easily replace its inefficient managers with better 
ones. On the other hand, a manager can easily leave the firm if his/her reward is lower than what 
he/she deserves. In addition, the ex post performance of the firm, to which a manager has contributed, 
is an important indicator to negotiate his/her ex ante salary and reward in current and future principal-
agent contracts. Furthermore, even within a firm, there is competition among managers for promotion 
(Fama, 1980). As a result, for their own long-term benefits, managers will try to serve the firm owners’ 
best interests, regardless of how many shares they own. Along with the managerial labor market, the 
threat of takeover could be another complementing discipline (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). Because low-
performing firms could easily be targeted for takeover, the positions of inefficient managers are more 
likely to be threatened in an active takeover market. For example, Mikkelson and Partch (1997) found 
that in the U.S. industrial companies that had not been acquired, the management turnover was 
negatively related to firm performance in the active takeover period (1984-1988), but this relationship 
disappeared in the subsequent less active takeover years (1989-1993). This absence of a relationship 
during the time of inactive takeover activities is consistent with the findings of Hadlock and Lumer 
(1997) during the period of 1933-1941. 
However, if managers own enough significant shares to classify themselves as large shareholders, 
these disciplines seem to be less efficient. In this circumstance, the managers could have enough 
power and influence to ignore both shareholders’ and market monitoring mechanisms to entrench 
their employment and salary, as well as to stay in their positions even if they are no longer competent 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1989). This situation is somehow similar to the expropriation effect in the case of 
blockholders, i.e. highly concentrated managerial ownership could lead to high managers’ private 
benefit of control, which is an exploitation of outside shareholders. For example, managers with 
significant ownership is more likely to have strong power to access inside information that outside 
shareholders do not have. This information could facilitate their insider’s trading or transactions with 
their related parties, which may benefit these managers themselves, but potentially harm the outside 
shareholders’ benefit (Barclay & Holderness, 1989). Based on these arguments, the entrenchment 
hypothesis expects that the more shares firm managers own, the worse the firm’s performance. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the expected relationships between ownership concentration and firm 
performance, based on the monitoring hypothesis and the entrenchment hypothesis. 
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Table 2.1. Expected relationships between ownership concentration and firm performance  
Managerial Ownership 
Convergence-of-Interest 
Hypothesis 
Entrenchment Hypothesis 
+ – 
Monitoring Hypothesis Expropriation Hypothesis 
Block Ownership 
2.2.3 Empirical evidence 
Based on above discussions, obviously the entrenchment hypothesis conflicts directly with the 
convergence-of-interest hypothesis, and the case of the expropriation and monitoring hypotheses is 
similar. Both the monitoring and convergence-of-interest hypotheses expect that a firm will perform 
better if its ownership structure is more concentrated because of the increase in shareholders’ 
monitoring incentive and in managers’ internal motivation to serve shareholders best. In contrast, the 
expropriation and entrenchment hypotheses focus on drawbacks of the private benefit of control, i.e. 
the possible exploitation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders and managers. Fama 
(1980); Jensen and Ruback (1983); La Porta et al. (2002), among others proposed that the prominent 
effect is strongly contingent on several factors, such as the legal framework (especially the level of 
legal protection of minority shareholders), the level of market competition and perfection, the level of 
information asymmetry and business culture. Thus, the relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm performance seems to be context-dependent and thus unpredictable. In addition, failing to 
incorporate the endogeneity of ownership structure into the empirical model could lead to biased 
regression estimates (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Consequently, many conflicting results in the 
relationship between ownership concentration and performance have been reported in the literature. 
Evidence from the U.S. 
Early empirical evidence on the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance may 
be traced back to Demsetz and Lehn (1985). On a sample of 511 firms in the U.S. from 1976 to 1980, 
they employed the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression while controlling for profit-determined 
factors, including capital, advertising and R&D expenditure, firm size, idiosyncratic volatility of stock 
prices, and utility and financial industry dummies. The authors did not find a significant relationship 
between the largest ownership (i.e. the total shares owned by the top five and 20 largest shareholders) 
and firms’ accounting profit rates. This result is consistent with the prediction of Demsetz (1983), who 
stated that, although a very diffuse ownership structure weakens the shareholders’ interest in 
monitoring, there must be a compensating reduction in risk and in the annoyance of monitoring 
management because otherwise, companies could not attract prospective investors to provide equity 
capital. Thus, the argument that the diffuse ownership could destroy firm value is unreasonable. 
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Morck et al. (1988) examined a sample of 371 Fortune 500 firms in the U.S. in 1980. In their study, 
Tobin’s Q and accounting profit rates were used as measurements of firm performance, while the 
ownership concentration was proxied by the managerial ownership. Their findings suggested an 
insignificant relationship between board ownership and firm performance in the linear regressions. 
However, a non-monotonic relation was discovered in the piecewise linear regression with Tobin’s Q 
as the dependent variable. The effect was negative for managerial ownership between 5% and 25%, 
and positive for managerial ownership between 0% and 5% or greater than 25%. Similarly, Hermalin 
and Weisbach (1991) employed the piecewise linear regression to study a sample of 134 NYSE firms in 
1971, 1974, 1977,1980 and 1983. The chosen managerial ownership thresholds were 1%, 5% and 20%. 
In both the all-year-pooled sample and the 1977 sample, similar sign patterns were observed, i.e. 
positive from 0% to 1% and from 5% to 20%, and negative from 1% to 5% and greater than 20%. 
However, only coefficients of managerial ownership from 0% to 5% were statistically significant. When 
board ownership was treated as an endogenous variable by using the Instrumental Variables (IV) 
estimator, both the size of coefficients and the significance level increased. The results indicated an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) also applied the piecewise linear regression of Morck et al. (1988) to 
two separated samples from 1976 (1173 firms) and 1986 (1093 firms) in the NYSE and the AMEX. 
Although the positive relationship between insider ownership and Tobin’s Q was confirmed when 
insider ownership was smaller than 5%, the relationship was generally insignificant afterwards. 
However, in the linear models in which the quadratic term of managerial ownership was included as 
an independent variable, they found an inverted U-shaped relationship with the optimum level of 
insider ownership of approximately 40%-50%. However, regardless of the models and samples used, 
the effect of block ownership on Tobin’s Q was insignificant. 
Using a sample of 867 firms in the U.S. from 1965 to 1988, Loderer and Martin (1997) found a positive 
effect of the managerial ownership on cumulative abnormal stock returns, but not on Tobin’s Q in the 
traditional OLS regression. Furthermore, based on the evidence of significant impacts of firm 
performance on board ownership, they stated that the previous single-equation tests could be biased 
because of the serious simultaneity problem. Supporting this view, when the 2SLS regression was 
employed to control for endogeneity, the relationship discovered in the OLS vanished. 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) re-examined a 223-firm random subsample from the sample of 511 
firms in Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and used the Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) to control for the 
endogeneity problem. The study examined two aspects of ownership structure: the proportion of 
shares owned by the five largest shareholders and the proportion of shares owned by managers, 
including the CEO and board members. Only the managerial ownership was treated as the endogenous 
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variable. The findings suggested that neither managerial ownership nor block ownership significantly 
affected Tobin’s Q. 
Similarly, by using the Fixed Effect estimator to control for invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity 
which is a possible source of endogeneity, Himmelberg et al. (1999) also found an insignificant 
relationship between managerial ownership and Tobin’s Q. However, when they applied the 
Instrumental Variable (IV) technique with the instrument for managerial ownership as firm 
idiosyncratic risk (proxied by the standard deviation of residuals from the CAPM-typed regression) to 
control for simultaneity, an inverted U-shaped relationship was discovered.  These opposing results 
implied that the identification of the sources of endogeneity could significantly alter the empirical 
results.  
Evidence from other countries 
Although the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has long been studied 
in the U.S. market, most empirical evidence from other countries is recent. Investigating the UK 
corporate governance system, Short and Keasey (1999) stated that the UK managers have less freedom 
to mount takeover defenses than their U.S. counterparts, and the cooperation of institutional investors 
in monitoring managers in the UK is more effective. Therefore, they expected that the UK management 
would become entrenched at a higher level of managerial ownership. Applying both pooled and panel 
data regressions, their empirical results confirmed the cubic relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance found in Morck et al. (1988). In addition, the higher levels of turning 
points at 15% and 42%, instead of 5% and 25%, were consistent with their initial hypothesis of the 
entrenchment at a higher ownership level. 
Using the OLS regression for the sample of 435 companies in 12 European nations2 during 1990-1995, 
a similar inverted U-shaped relationship between block ownership and market-to-book value as well 
as return on asset (ROA) was reported in Thomsen and Pedersen (2000). However, there was no 
relationship between block ownership with the third measurement of firm performance, i.e. sale 
growth. Another European country, Spain, was also examined by De Miguel et al. (2004). On a sample 
of 135 listed financial companies during 1990-1999, the authors used the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator to control for the endogeneity. The bell-shaped impact of ownership 
concentration on the ratio of market value of shares to replacement value of total assets (the proxy 
for firm performance) was also discovered. Furthermore, the impact of managerial ownership was 
                                                          
2 Including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain and Sweden. 
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found to be non-linear. It was positive at the low and high levels of ownership, but negative at the 
intermediate level. This cubic relationship is consistent with that of Morck et al. (1988). 
Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) employed the 2SLS estimator to investigate 175 Greek listed 
companies in 2000. Managerial ownership and block ownership were treated as endogenous variables 
in separated models. The results from the 2SLS yield evidence of endogenous ownership structure, 
and profitability was a positive predictor of block ownership but not of managerial ownership. Thus, 
the authors proposed that block ownership was more likely to be endogenous than insider ownership. 
The finding was directly opposite to what Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) had proposed. Controlling for 
endogeneity, Kapopoulos and Lazaretou (2007) found positive influences of both block ownership and 
managerial ownership on Tobin’s Q. The positive impact of block ownership on firm performance, 
which is measured by ROA, was also found in Gedajlovic and Shapiro’s (2002) study of 334 Japanese 
firms in the 1986-1991 period. Similarly, Liu, Uchida, and Yang (2012) stated that the positive 
relationship between managerial ownership and the change of Tobin’s Q was observed in China during 
the financial crisis of 2007-2008. However, their most striking result was the U-shaped relationship 
between large shareholders’ ownership and firm performance, which was distinct from most empirical 
evidence in the literature. 
Welch (2003) also applied the 2SLS to 114 public companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange in 
the period 1999-2000 and found no linear relationship between managerial ownership as well as block 
ownership and firm performance. In addition, she also employed a generalized non-linear model to 
examine a possible cubic relationship. Unlike the findings of Morck et al. (1988), there was limited 
evidence of a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and Tobin’s Q as well as the 
average of annual profit rate. Recently, New Zealand, another Oceanian country, was considered in 
Fauzi and Locke (2012) by examining the roles of board structure and board ownership on firm 
performance in a sample of 79 listed companies during 2007-2011. The results from the Generalized 
Linear Model (GLM) indicated that managerial ownership positively affected firm performance, which 
was measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA. Meanwhile, the impact of block ownership was negative, which 
was consistent with the result of G. Jiang, Yue, and Zhao (2009) in China. However, both studies simply 
ignored the commonly accepted endogeneity of ownership structure, casting doubt on the validity of 
their results. 
Balsmeier and Czarnitzki (2015) investigated the relationship between block ownership and 
employment growth, the proxy for firm performance, in 28 Central and Eastern European countries 
and found an inverted U-shaped relationship by using the OLS. While the result was robust for the non-
EU-member countries, the relationship vanished in the subsample of the EU members. Based on these 
results, the authors proposed that firms in well developed countries do not need blockholders’ 
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monitoring over management. However, this explanation strictly conflicts with the significant 
relationships found in the U.S in previous studies. 
Sheu and Yang (2005) conducted their study on a sample of 333 Taiwanese listed electronics 
companies in 1996-2000. The results from the OLS showed that insider ownership did not have any 
influence on the value added of a firm – the measurement of firm performance. The same method was 
applied in Shah and Hussain (2012) on non-financial companies listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange; 
however, a negative relationship was observed. In addition, they also reported an insignificant impact 
of block ownership on firm performance. 
In conclusion, empirical evidence from both developed and developing countries has been very 
inconclusive. In addition, most studies in transition economies, especially in Asia, simply ignored the 
widely accepted endogeneity of ownership structure. Some others did care about this problem, but 
their estimation techniques were usually Fixed Effects and Instrumental Variables, which cannot 
completely control for endogeneity. This study attempts to fill this gap by applying the better 
developed estimation of GMM in panel data. Thus, the results could provide more valid empirical 
evidence to the existing inconclusive literature. 
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Table 2.2. Selected empirical evidence on the relationships between block ownership, managerial ownership and firm performance 
  (a) Evidence from the U.S. 
Study Research sample Research period 
Firm 
performanc
e variable 
Regression 
method 
Relationship with firm 
performance 
Block 
ownership 
Managerial 
ownership 
Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) 
511 firms 1976-1980 ROE OLS X  
Morck et al. (1988) 
371 Fortune 500 firms in the 
U.S. 
1980 Tobin’s Q Piecewise OLS   
Himmelberg et al. 
(1999) 
Randomly selected 600 firms in 
the U.S. 
1982-1992 Tobin’s Q 
OLS, fixed 
effects, IV 
 
OLS, fixed effects (X) 
IV (     ) 
Cho (1998) 
326 Fortune 500 manufacturing 
firms 
1991  
Piecewise OLS, 
2SLS 
 X 
Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) 
Subsample of 223 listed firms 
from Demsetz and Lehn (1985) 
1976-1990 
Tobin’s Q 
 
OLS, 2SLS X X 
Loderer and Martin 
(1997) 
867 firms 1965-1988    X 
Chung and Pruitt 
(1996) 
404 firms 1987 Tobin’s Q 2SLS  + 
Palia and 
Lichtenberg (1999) 
600 firms from random digit 
generator 
1982-1984 
Total factor 
productivity 
Piecewise OLS  + 
Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) 
134 firms listed in NYSE 
1971, 1974, 1977, 
1980, 1983 
EBIT, 
Tobin’s Q 
Piecewise OLS, 
IV 
  
McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) 
1173 firms in 1976 and 1093 
firms in 1986 in NYSE and AMEX 
1976 and 1986 Tobin’s Q 
OLS, Piecewise 
OLS 
X  
Holderness, 
Kroszner, and 
Sheehan (1999) 
1419 listed firms in 1935 and 
4202 listed firms in 1995 
1935 and 1995 Tobin’s Q Piecewise OLS   
 - inverted U-shaped,     - U-shaped relationship,   +  - positive relationship,           - cubic relationship, X – no relationship,   –  -negative relationship  
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  (b) Evidence from other countries 
Study Research sample 
Research 
period 
Firm performance variable Method 
Relationship with firm 
performance 
Block 
ownership 
Managerial 
ownership 
Thomsen and 
Pedersen (2000) 
435 companies from 12 
European countries 
1990-1995 
Market-to-book value (MBV), ROA 
and Sale Growth 
OLS   
Gedajlovic and 
Shapiro (2002) 
334 Japanese companies 1986-1991 ROA OLS +  
De Miguel et al. 
(2004) 
135 non-financial listed 
companies in Spain 
1990-1999 
Market value of share/replacement 
value of total assets 
IV-GMM   
Kapopoulos and 
Lazaretou (2007) 
175 listed firms covering all 
sectors in Greece 
2000 Tobin’s Q OLS, 2SLS + + 
Li, Moshirian, 
Nguyen, and Tan 
(2007) 
290 post-privatized SOEs in 
China 
1992-2000 ROA and ROS OLS  + 
G. Jiang et al. 
(2009) 
149 Chinese listed 
manufacturing firms 
1999-2002 Change in return on sale (ROS) 
Multivariate 
Regression –  
Liu et al. (2012) 
970 Chinese listed firms 
(excluding financial) 
Crisis period of 
2007-2008 
Change in Tobin’s Q OLS  + 
Short and Keasey 
(1999) 
Random sample of 225 UK 
listed firms 
1988-1992 MBV, ROE 
OLS, panel 
data 
  
Welch (2003) 114 Australian listed firms 1999-2000  
2SLS,  
piecewise OLS 
X X 
Fauzi and Locke 
(2012) 
79 listed firms in New 
Zealand 
2007-2011 Tobin’s Q, ROA 
Generalized 
Linear Model – + 
Balsmeier and 
Czarnitzki (2015) 
28 Central and European 
countries 
2002-2009 Employment growth OLS   
Sheu and Yang 
(2005) 
333 Taiwanese electronics 
listed companies 
1996-2000 Value added of a firm OLS  X 
Shah and Hussain 
(2012) 
61 non-financial listed 
companies 
2008-2010 Tobin’s Q Fixed Effects X – 
- inverted U-shaped,     - U-shaped relationship,  +  - positive relationship,            - cubic relationship, X – no relationship,  –  - negative relationship 
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2.3 State ownership and firm performance 
2.3.1 Theoretical perspectives 
The debate on the efficiency of state ownership versus private ownership has attracted a fair amount 
of concern in the literature. Supporters of state ownership usually appeal to the traditional objective 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), i.e. providing instruments to cure market failures through pricing 
policies that have taken marginal social costs into consideration. Thus, although privatization of SOEs 
possibly creates benefits for new private owners, observed higher profitability possibly “has come at 
the expense of the rest of society through the exploitation of market power” (La Porta & Florencio, 
1999, p. 1193). The exploitation of public interest and social welfare could be more severe in the case 
of for-profit monopolies because they can abuse their monopoly power to take advantage of 
customers through high price and/or low product quality (Loc, 2006). Another potential disadvantage 
of privatization is that workers could suffer from the post-privatization restructuring process through 
layoffs or wage cuts. Furthermore, since the state is usually the sole owner or a significant owner of 
SOEs, they do not face the free rider problem in management monitoring, which is significant in the 
dispersed ownership structure of privately-owned companies (Yarrow et al., 1986). 
However, the arguments and empirical evidence against state ownership and in favor of private 
ownership as well as privatization have been becoming dominant. This view is supported by three 
main theories, including (i) agency theory, (ii) property right theory, and (iii) public choice theory. In 
essence, these theories are not totally different; they somehow overlap and complement one another 
in explaining the superiority of private ownership. The agency theory states that, although managers 
overall have a natural tendency to exploit firm owners through their selfish decisions, this problem in 
private firms seems to be less severe than in state-owned counterparts. The reason is that under an 
efficient market, managers of private firms are disciplined by numerous control mechanisms. They 
include internal mechanisms such as compensation and reward incentives, as well as external 
mechanisms such as monitoring activities from shareholders and debt holders, a competitive 
managerial labor market and the threat of takeover (Jensen, 1986). These mechanisms create 
incentives and pressures that not only motivate but also force managers to act as good agents of 
shareholders, but unfortunately, they are almost absent in SOEs (Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000). For 
example, SOEs are not likely to be threatened by takeovers or bankruptcy because their budget 
constraint is “soft”, i.e. they are able to easily access loans or bailouts from the government 
(Ramamurti, 2000). In addition, SOEs face a dual principal-agent relationship: the management team 
is the agent of and monitored by the government, which in turn is an agent of the real owners, i.e. the 
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voting public (Yarrow et al., 1986). Because these owners are extremely diffuse, the consequences of 
the free rider problem are significantly severe. Thus, although the state does not actually own shares, 
it does have almost the ultimate rights of a sole shareholder. These arguments somehow can be linked 
to the property rights theory, which points out that in SOEs, “the property rights are poorly defined” 
(Ramamurti, 2000, p. 528). As a result, the dual agency relationship leads to less motivation and 
efficiency of owners (the public) in monitoring managers, which in turn could result in lower firm 
performance of the state-owned firms compared to the private counterparts. 
As an expansion of the property rights theory, the public choice theory focuses on the unique principal-
agent relationship in SOEs between the public and politicians. It proposes that politicians tend to force 
SOEs under their control to carry out personal objectives that could assist them to gain reputation, re-
election or promotion. These objectives may conflict with firm performance (Cuervo & Villalonga, 
2000). Compounding the problem, the voting public is so dispersed that control mechanisms over 
politicians become extremely weak and inefficient. Even if the voting population perceives the 
inefficiency, a highly imperfect “market” for political control (through public voting rights) prevents 
them from carrying out frequent modifications (Yarrow et al., 1986). These conditions favor private 
incentives of politicians, which can also be classified as private benefits of control. Thus, those 
arguments can be considered another aspect of the expropriation hypothesis, in which minority 
shareholders are expanded to the population as a whole. 
It should be noted that the arguments against state ownership rely on the assumption of an efficient 
and competitive market that can provide favorable conditions for effective market controlling 
mechanisms over management. Under an inefficient market, the failure of these mechanisms could 
make corporate governance in private-owned companies become no better than in SOEs. On the other 
hand, political system characteristics play a role in determining the performance of SOEs, as they could 
limit or favor exploiting the incentives of politicians. Thus, Yarrow et al. (1986, p. 332) stated that “the 
relative merits of private and public monitoring depend upon the trade-off between market 
inefficiencies and incentive failure in government departments or agencies”. Consequently, it is not 
easy to predict whether state ownership or private ownership is superior in all contexts. 
2.3.2 Empirical evidence 
In spite of conflicting arguments on the role of state ownership, in recent literature supporting 
evidence for the positive relationship between private ownership and firm performance has been 
dominant. This situation could partly stem from how firm performance is measured. An ideal 
measurement of SOEs’ efficiency should take into consideration all objectives of SOEs, i.e. curing 
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market failures and providing social welfare while accepting the trade-off with profitability. However, 
these overall outcomes are generally difficult to observe. Instead, researchers usually use firm-level 
outcomes, such as firm profitability, market value or a firm-level efficiency frontier, to measure firm 
performance. This possibly leads to underestimates of state ownership efficiency, especially in terms 
of its social benefits. 
There are two popular approaches used to investigate the impact of state ownership on firm 
performance. The most common approach is the cross-sectional comparison of performance among 
firms with different levels of state and private ownership. Under the presumption that private 
ownership is more efficient than state ownership, it is hypothesized that among cross-sectional firms, 
after controlling for other related factors, the higher the state ownership, the lower the firm 
performance (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Fauzi & Locke, 2012; Welch, 2003; 
among others). The second approach is evaluating the performance of SOEs before and after their 
privatization. If state ownership is less efficient than private ownership, firm performance and 
efficiency should be improved after the privatization (Kang & Kim, 2012; Loc, Lanjouw, & Lensink, 
2006; Omran, 2004; among others). 
Villalonga (2000) provided an in depth meta-review on existing empirical cross-sectional studies. 
Among 153 studies reviewed, 104 supported the hypothesis that private ownership is more efficient, 
14 were against and 35 were neutral. In addition, some studies found non-monotonic relationships 
between the proportion of state share and firm performance. For example, in the review of Yu (2013), 
6 out of 14 studies reported the U-shaped relationship, meanwhile another 4 were negative, 1 was 
positive, 1 reported the inverted U-shaped and 2 were neutral. In Vietnam, Tran et al. (2014) 
discovered the negative impact of state ownership on firms’ accounting profitability (ROA, ROE) and 
labor productivity (value added per employee) in the examination of an unbalanced panel data set 
from more than 2,000 firms during 2004-2012. Meanwhile, using a sample of listed companies on the 
HOSE from 2007 to 2012, Phung and Hoang (2013) found that state ownership had a bell-shaped 
relationship with Tobin’s Q and ROA. Thus, although the supporting side of private ownership is 
dominant, there are still many conflicts among countries or even among different periods in the same 
countries. 
Studies on the effects of privatization on firm performance are also inconclusive. For example, Kang 
and Kim (2012) in the evaluation of partial privatization in China concluded that the change of SOEs 
from the government-controlled model to MSOEs (market or profit-seeking SOEs) model improved 
firm performance, which was measured by Tobin’s Q, ROA and excess firm value. However, the 
comparison method used in this study could suffer from selection bias, because the authors simply 
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ignored the change in performance of state-owned firms that had not changed their operating model. 
Thus, one cannot conclude whether the performance improvement is truly a result of the change of 
ownership identity or other reasons. Loc et al. (2006) tackled this problem by using the Difference in 
Difference (DID) method to compare the performance of the treatment group (privatized SOEs) and 
the control group (un-privatized SOEs). They concluded that the observed improvement in 
profitability, sale revenue, efficiency, and employee income truly resulted from privatization. The 
same method was applied by Omran (2004) in Egypt, but the author did not find any post-privatization 
improvement in the performance of the treatment group compared to the control group. However, it 
should be noted that in their studies, the selection bias was not totally overcome. It is possible that 
privatized firms are “selected” by politicians based on certain objectives. For example, lower 
performing SOEs could be chosen to be privatized with the hope that their performance could be 
improved through private ownership. In contrast, targets could be the best performing SOEs, as the 
price of state ownership could be maximized. Therefore, the estimates still could be biased. 
Given the social missions of SOEs, comparing only the financial performance between state ownership 
and private ownership could be unfair. Taking the social objectives of SOEs into consideration, Bozec, 
Breton, and Cote (2002) stated that in their sample of the 500 largest Canadian firms in 1985, SOEs 
without the profit-maximizing objective performed worse than their private counterparts (firm 
performance was measured by accounting profitability including return on sales, return on assets, and 
asset turnover). After controlling for goals, there was no difference in performance between SOEs and 
private companies. It implied that no form of ownership outperformed the other, as both have the 
same efficiency in carrying out their own targets. Bozec et al. (2002) also pointed out that there is a 
case in which SOEs outperform private companies, that is public monopoly. The explanation is that 
compared with others, public monopolies have many more competitive advantages, and thus stronger 
competing ability in the market. 
Given that SOEs normally have a dual objective: social welfare and profitability, the question is why 
some empirical evidence showed that SOEs could be even more profitable than privately owned 
companies. One reasonable explanation could be the “helping hand" from the government (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 2002). Under support from the government, SOEs easily access financial and political 
resources as well as business networks, which are significant market competitive advantages. 
However, assuming that state ownership truly improves firm efficiency through this mechanism, it is 
not necessarily the case that increasing state shares in companies can make the economy as a whole 
better. The reason is that if state ownership increases in every company, there will no longer be a 
competitive advantage because of the saturation of accessibility to limited favorable resources. 
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Meanwhile, the drawbacks of state ownership may become more severe. More importantly, it is 
possible that if private companies had been able to access these resources, their performance would 
have been even better than that of SOEs. Unfortunately, there is not sufficient evidence for this 
argument in the current literature.
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Table 2.3. Selected empirical evidence on the relationship between state ownership and firm performance 
(a) Cross-sectional comparison 
Study Research sample 
Research 
period 
Firm performance variable 
Regression 
method 
Impact of 
state 
ownership 
Konings (1997) 
 
334 firms in Romania (119), Bulgaria 
(115) and Hungary (100) 
1990-1995 Growth rate Random effects – 
Sun, Tong, and Tong 
(2002) 
1877 firm-year observations of listed 
companies in China 
1994-1997 MBR, ROA, ROE 
Pooled OLS, fixed 
effects 
 
Hovey, Li, and Naughton 
(2003) 
97 randomly selected firms listed in 
China 
1997-1999 Tobin’s Q OLS X 
Wei, Xie, and Zhang 
(2005) 
5284 firm-year observations of Chinese 
partially privatized SOEs 
1991-2001 Tobin’s Q OLS, 2SLS  
B.-B. Jiang, Laurenceson, 
and Tang (2008) 
794 listed companies on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange 
2004 ROA, ROE, ROS, REITA OLS + 
Lin, Ma, and Su (2009) 
461 publicly listed manufacturing firms 
in China 
1999-2002 
Estimated efficient score. Input = 
labor, capital stock, intermediate 
input. Output = sales revenue 
Two-stage 
Bootstrapping 
DEA 
– 
Le and Buck (2009) 
3,656 firm-year observations of listed 
firms in China 
2003-2005 ROA, ROS 2SLS + 
Hess, Gunasekarage, and 
Hovey (2010) 
Balanced sample of 5170 firm-year 
observations of 1034 Chines firms 
2000-2004 Tobin’s Q 
Piecewise OLS, 
Simultaneous 
Equations Model 
 
Phung and Hoang (2013) All listed companies in Vietnam 2007-2012 Tobin’s Q 
Fixed effects, 
Random effects 
 
Yu (2013) 
10,639 firm-year observations of non-
financial Chinese firms 
2003-2010 ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q 
Fixed effects, 
Random effects 
 
Tran et al. (2014) 
Unbalanced sample of 38,143 firm-year 
observations of Vietnam firms 
2004-2012 
ROA, ROE, labor productivity, 
efficient use of capital 
Pooled, random 
effects, GMM – 
   - inverted U-shaped,     - U-shaped relationship,  +  - positive linear relationship,  – negative linear relationship,  X – no relationship
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b) Pre- and post-privatization comparison 
Study Research sample 
Research 
period 
Firm performance variable 
Regression 
method 
Impact of 
privatization 
Megginson, Nash, 
and Van 
Randenborgh (1994) 
61 partially or fully privatized companies 
from 18 countries 
1961-1990 
Profitability, Operating Efficiency, 
Capital Investment, Sales, 
Employment, Leverage, Payout 
Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test + 
Boubakri and Cosset 
(1998) 
79 partially or fully privatized companies 
from 21 developing countries 
1980-1992 
Profitability, Efficiency, Capital 
Investment spending, Sales, 
Employment, Leverage, Dividends 
Two-tailed 
Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test 
+ 
La Porta and 
Florencio (1999) 
170 nonfinancial privatized firms in 
Mexico 
1983-1991 
Profitability, Operating Efficiency, 
Labor, Assets and investment, 
Sales, Prices, Net taxes 
OLS + 
Claessens and 
Djankov (2002) 
6,354 privatized and state-owned 
manufacturing enterprises in seven 
Eastern European countries 
1992-1995 
Sale, Employment, Labor 
productivity 
Fix effects, 
Cluster effects, 
Random effects  
less than 2 
years (x), 3 
years or 
more (+)  
Omran (2004) 54 privatized firms and 54 SOEs in Egypt 1994-1998 
Profitability, Operation efficiency, 
Real sales, Employment, Leverage  
Difference-in-
difference x 
 
Gupta (2005) 
 
2,230 firm-year observations from 
partially privatized companies in India 
1990-2000 
Profitability, Productivity, 
Investment 
Fix effects, 
GMM + 
Loc, Lanjouw, and 
Lensink (2006) 
121 equitized firms and 84 SOEs 
3 years before 
and after 
privatization 
Profitability, Operating efficiency, 
Real sale, Leverage, Employment, 
Employee income 
Difference-in-
difference + 
Kang and Kim (2012) 
6,588 non-financial firm-year 
observations of listed companies in 
China 
1994-2002 Tobin’s Q, ROA, Excess value 
Fixed effects, 
GMM + 
Hagemejer, 
Tyrowicz, and 
Svejnar (2014) 
All Polish medium and large enterprises 1995-2009 Value added, Employment, Capital 
2SLS, LIML 
(control for 
endogeneity) 
x 
+ - Positive impact, – - Negative impact, x - No impact 
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2.4 Hypotheses 
Since there are conflicts in both theoretical perspectives and empirical evidence, I hypothesize that 
the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in the context of the Vietnamese 
stock market could be non-monotonic. According to the empirical evidence of Morck et al. (1988), at 
the low and high levels of managerial ownership, the convergence-of-interest effect dominates the 
entrenchment effect, leading to a positive relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance. However, the opposite is observed at the middle level of managerial ownership, 
resulting in a negative relationship. Based on this finding, the hypothesis H1 is constructed. 
H1: The relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance is positive at the low and 
high levels of the managerial ownership, and negative at the middle level. 
Similarly, empirical evidence of the impacts of block ownership on firm performance is also 
inconsistent, especially in the countries outside the U.S. This study follows De Miguel et al. (2004) and 
Balsmeier and Czarnitzki (2015) who found the inverted U-shaped relationship to form the hypothesis 
H2. 
H2: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the percentage of shares owned by the 
blockholders (block ownership) and firm performance. 
There are several studies examining the effects of state ownership on firm performance in Vietnamese 
companies. The inverted U-shaped relationship was found in Phung and Hoang (2013), indicating the 
existence of both a “helping hand” and a “grabbing hand” from the government, and the dominant 
effect depends on the levels of state ownership in companies. Based on their findings, I develop the 
hypothesis H3. 
H3: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between state ownership and firm performance. 
2.5 Overview of the Vietnamese stock market 
The Vietnamese stock market was officially established after the launch of the Ho Chi Minh City 
Securities Trading Center in July 2000, followed by the Hanoi Securities Trading Center in March 2005. 
Then, they were renamed and upgraded to the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) and the Hanoi 
Stock Exchange (HNX) in 2007 and 2009 respectively. After their establishment, the number of stocks 
listed on both exchanges increased significantly before 2010, and then stabilized afterwards. However, 
as an immature market, the number of listed companies is still very limited. At the end of 2015, there 
were in total 674 listed companies in the Vietnamese stock market, including 377 on the HNX and 307 
on the HOSE. 
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Table 2.4. The number of stocks and Market Capitalization of stocks on the HOSE and the HNX  
 Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
No. of stocks 
listed 
HNX 112 168 257 367 393 396 377 365 377 
HOSE 138 170 196 275 301 308 301 305 307 
Mkt.Cap.* 
(trillion VND) 
HNX 130.1 55.2 125.4 131.82 83.7 86.543 106.87 136.02 151.6 
HOSE 364.4 169.7 495 591.3 453.8 678.4 842.1 985.3 1146.9 
* Value on the last trading day of the year 
Source: HOSE and HNX Annual Reports 
As illustrated in Table 2.4, the number of stocks listed on the HOSE was slightly smaller than that of 
the HNX over time. However, the market capitalization of stock on the HOSE was dominant. For 
example, at the end of 2015, market capitalization of stocks on the HOSE was nearly eight times higher 
than that of the HNX (1,146.9 trillion VND versus 151.6 trillion VND). Furthermore, the growth rate of 
market capitalization of the HOSE was also significantly higher (an annual average of 30.19% against 
12.98%) during 2007-2015. This may be attributed to the fact that smaller companies normally target 
the HNX, which is less developed but has less strict listing rules compared to the HOSE (see Vuong 
(2010) for more details). 
Currently, both HOSE and HNX are using total stock market indices, namely VN-Index and HNX-Index 
respectively. They are calculated by the volume-weighted average of share prices of all stocks listed 
on the markets. Besides, the HOSE is employing an additional index, i.e. VN30, that includes the most 
liquid stocks on the HOSE only, excludes shares that are not free to trade (e.g. shares owned by 
managers and their relatives, strategic shares, state shares), and restricts the weight of each stock at 
10%. Although the VN30 is able to eliminate the effects of illiquid stocks and prominent weights of 
super large-cap stocks in calculation, its data is unavailable during the early period of the HOSE since 
the index was introduced in January 2009. Therefore, because of the dominance of market 
capitalization and the richness of data, the VN-Index is currently widely employed as the benchmark 
market index for the Vietnamese stock market. 
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the name of the company, especially strategic decisions that strongly affect shareholders’ interest. The 
BOD has the right to appoint the Executive Board (Ban dieu hanh), which is in charge of a firm’s daily 
operations. The Executive Board includes a Chief Executive Officer (CEO), deputy CEOs and a Chief 
Accountant. The GMS also appoints the Supervisory Board (in Vietnamese: Ban kiem soat), which is 
independent from both the BOD and Executive Board. A major function of the Supervisory Board is to 
supervise the BOD and the Executive Board in managing and operating the company. While members 
of the Executive Board could be selected from the BOD, members of the Supervisory Board must 
neither hold any position in both the BOD and the Executive Board nor be relatives of any members in 
both Boards4. 
Figure 2.2. Corporate governance structure in Vietnam5 
 
Appointment and Removal;   Supervision      
Theoretically, BOD, Supervisory Board and Executive Board must cooperate with, as well as supervise 
each other in managing and operating the company to serve the best interests of shareholders. 
However, from the principal-agent relationship perspective, all of them share the role of shareholders’ 
representatives who act on behalf of shareholders to operate the firm. Thus, their incentives and 
interests are likely to be similar in terms of exploiting outside shareholders. Therefore, in the 
examination of the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance, this study 
considers all three Boards as one unified management team, so managerial ownership is computed as 
total shares owned by all members of these Boards. 
2.7 Summary 
Regarding ownership concentration, the monitoring and the convergence-of-interest hypotheses 
predict that block ownership and managerial ownership negatively relate to firm performance. This 
contradicts the expectation of the expropriation and entrenchment hypotheses. A similar situation 
                                                          
4 Article 164, the Vietnamese Enterprise Law 2014 
5 Because of the uniqueness of the two-tier corporate governance system in Vietnam, Board names are translated differently 
in different documents, which sometimes conflict and cause confusion. This study uses the translation system of Nguyen et 
al. (2015) to ensure consistency. 
General Meeting of 
Shareholders (GMS) 
Board of Directors 
(BOD) 
Supervisory 
Board 
Chairperson 
of BOD 
Executive 
Board 
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occurs in the relationship between state ownership and firm performance, as a result of the contrary 
effects of the agency problem and the “helping hand” from governments. Therefore, the impact of 
ownership structure on firm performance is unpredictable and could be non-monotonic. In this 
chapter, based on some empirical evidence, I hypothesized a cubic relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance in the Vietnamese stock market, while the impact of block ownership 
and state ownership on firm performance is expected to be inverted U-shaped. 
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Chapter 3 
Data and Methodology 
This chapter describes the research sample and estimation method used in the study. The first two 
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 introduce the data collection procedure and variable definitions, followed by the 
proposed empirical models in Section 3.3. Subsequently, Section 3.4 discusses the endogeneity 
problem in examining the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Estimation 
methods are presented in Section 3.5, in which the system-GMM is mainly focused on. 
3.1 Data 
To investigate the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance, a sample of listed 
companies in the manufacturing industry on the HOSE is employed6. Although the HOSE was 
established in 2000, suitable data for this analysis has been available only since 2007. Thus, the sample 
period is restricted to nine years from 2007 to 2015. There are 95 manufacturing companies listed on 
the HOSE during the research period. Unlike other industries such as real estate, construction, financial 
or trading, outputs of the manufacturing industry are usually the most essential and necessary for the 
economy in both consumption and production aspects. Therefore, manufacturing companies seem to 
have been affected the least by the consequences of the recent global financial crisis in 2007-2008 and 
the Vietnamese housing bubble in 2010-2011. Thus, using the dataset of manufacturing companies 
could minimize potential noises affecting the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance. 
Ownership data is hand-collected from companies’ annual reports and corporate governance reports, 
while financial data is obtained from audited financial statements. According to the Circular 52/12/TT-
BTC, the disclosure of managerial ownership has been compulsory in the corporate governance reports 
since 2012, but there is no requirement in the cases of state ownership and block ownership. Thus, in 
general, the release of ownership structure is optional in the Vietnamese stock market. Therefore, the 
ownership data is unavailable in some companies, especially at the beginning of the research period. 
It makes the data strongly unbalanced with almost all available information concentrating on a few 
recent years. 
According to Vietnamese national listing rules7, all top managers (including the Board of Directors, 
Supervisory Board, Executive Board and the Chief Accountant) must commit to hold 100% of their 
                                                          
6 Although the Vietnamese stock market consists of two independent stock exchanges: HOSE and HNX, due to 
time constraint for data collection, the sample could not be extended to HNX. 
7 Decree 58/2012/ND-CP 
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shares for at least six months after the listing day, and 50% during the subsequent six months. 
Therefore, firms listed in year T are included into the sample from year T+2, in order to allow sufficient 
time for changes in managerial ownership and their potential effects on firm performance to take 
place. After combining this constraint with the availability of ownership data, the sample of 76 
companies with 406 observations was formed. 
3.2 Variable definition 
3.2.1 Dependent variable 
In order to test the proposed hypotheses, firm performance needs to be quantified. Among numerous 
measurements of firm performance, the market-based Tobin’s Q has been used the most in studies 
relating to ownership structure (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Compared to accounting-based 
measurements, the market-based Tobin’s Q has several advantages. First, Tobin’s Q can incorporate 
the market estimation of the value of intangible assets, which can be considered an aspect of 
performance (Perfect & Wiles, 1994). Second, as a forward-looking measurement, Tobin’s Q can reflect 
market forecast and evaluation of current business operations and strategies, as well as capture long-
term effects of corporate actions (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Hu & Izumida, 2008). Thus, Tobin’s Q is 
also employed in this study. Furthermore, using the similar proxy of firm performance as most of the 
recent studies could facilitate the comparisons between Vietnamese companies and their international 
counterparts. 
The original Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of a firm to its established replacement 
cost (Tobin, 1969). However, due to the unavailability of information, estimating the replacement cost 
of the firm’s total assets is arduous. On the other hand, the market value of the firm should be the sum 
of the market value of equity and the market value of debt. However, since the debt market in Vietnam 
is still underdeveloped, estimating the market value of debt is not an easy task. Therefore, a simplified 
version of Tobin’s Q developed by Chung and Pruitt (1994) is employed in this study. In the modified 
formula, the replacement cost and market value of debt are replaced by the book value of total assets 
and debt respectively. Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) approach not only approximates the original Tobin’s 
Q but also minimizes computational effort by utilizing available data from companies’ financial reports 
(Nguyen, 2015). The market value of equity (also called market capitalization) is calculated as the 
product of the market stock price and the number of stocks outstanding. Finally, Tobin’s Q at the end 
of year t is determined as follows: 
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑡 =  
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡  × 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑡 + 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑡
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡
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However, as Tobin’s Q is a “snapshot” measurement, it possibly cannot provide a whole picture of firm 
performance during a certain period. To overcome this problem, the Average Tobin’s Q (denoted as 
AvQ) is employed throughout the empirical analysis, as in Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), Fauzi and 
Locke (2012). 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑡 =
𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠 𝑄𝑡
2
 
3.2.2 Independent variables 
Ownership structure 
In this study, ownership structure is examined in two distinct aspects: ownership concentration and 
state ownership. Ownership concentration is measured by two proxies: block ownership and 
managerial ownership. 
Block ownership 
In present studies, block ownership is normally measured by the total percentage of shares owned by 
a certain number (usually 1, 5 or 20) of the largest shareholders of the company. The largest 
shareholders could affect firm performance directly through their decisions on the firm’s long-term 
strategies, capital structure or asset allocation, or indirectly through their significant voting rights and 
controlling power over firm managers, who are in charge of the firm’s daily operations. However, in 
the context of Vietnam, a blockholder is defined as a shareholder who owns at least 5% of a firm’s total 
shares8, thus only the ownerships of these owners are released in companies’ annual reports. 
Therefore, in this study, block ownership (denoted as BO) is measured by the total fraction of shares 
owned by all the above-defined blockholders. 
In addition, several block-ownership-related variables affecting firm performance are also included in 
empirical models. The first candidate is the changing status of the largest shareholder (denoted as 
LOChange), which has the value of 1 if the largest shareholder of the company is changed, 0 otherwise. 
Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2014) stated that poor performing firms are usually associated with poor 
management, thus their potential for improvement is greater than others’, making them more likely 
to be takeover targets. Thus, it is expected that the change of the largest shareholder could result in 
better management as well as performance. The second variable is the controlling shareholder dummy 
(denoted as CtrlDum), i.e. 1 if the company has a controlling shareholder, 0 otherwise. Commonly, a 
controlling shareholder is defined as the shareholder who owns more than half of the firm shares. This 
owner has a strong power over corporate governance, as he/she could dominate others thanks to their 
significant voting rights. Therefore, similar to the case of large shareholders discussed in Section 2.2.1, 
                                                          
8 Article 6, the Vietnamese Securities Law 2006 
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the controlling shareholder could also impact firm performance through the monitoring effect and/or 
expropriation effect. Finally, the number of blockholders (denoted as NoBO) should also be considered. 
Because of its calculation, block ownership could be highly correlated with the number of blockholders 
in the companies. Meanwhile, the number of blockholders could have potential impacts on firm 
performance, since multiple large shareholders should be more effective in controlling and supervising 
one another; therefore minimizing the negative effects of the expropriation from a sole blockholder. 
Thus, failing to incorporate the variable NoBO into the models could potentially lead to the 
endogeneity problem. 
Managerial ownership 
Managerial ownership (denoted as MO) is computed as the percentage of shares owned by all 
members of the Board of Directors, Executive Board and Supervisory Board. Excluding the Supervisory 
Board, which is independent from other Boards, the duality commonly occurs in the sample: most 
members of the Executive Board are also members of the Board of Directors. Therefore, to avoid 
duplication, dual managers are only considered once in the calculation of managerial ownership. 
State ownership 
In Vietnam, the government does not directly own firm shares. Instead, state ownership in Vietnamese 
listed companies in general is managed by two types of owners. The first is the State Capital Investment 
Corporation (SCIC), which acts as an agent of the government in managing state capital investment, 
which focuses on companies in key sectors and essential industries. The second is other SOEs, which 
hold other firms’ shares with the purposes of diversification or investment. Therefore, in this research, 
state ownership (denoted as SO) is calculated as the total fraction of shares owned by both SCIC and 
other SOEs. In addition, a modification should be made in the case that the SOE owners are not fully 
state-owned, i.e. if there is a% state ownership in firm A, and firm A in turn has b% of shares in firm B, 
the state ownership in firm B will be [(a×b)/100]%. 
Control Variables 
To minimize potential bias caused by omitted variables, the empirical models also control for selected 
firm characteristics variables affecting firm performance, including firm size, leverage, growth 
opportunity, firm age and systematic risk. 
Firm size is expected to positively affect performance as a result of the economies of scale. Large firms 
with their plentiful resources are able to invest in projects that small firms are excluded from (Hall & 
Weiss, 1967); therefore they can easily earn monopoly profit. In addition, large firms usually have 
lower bankruptcy risk and higher transparency, thus they are able to more easily access debt markets 
with bigger loans and at low cost to maximize the benefits of tax shields (Antoniou, Guney, & Paudyal, 
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2008). The proxy of firm size used in this study is average total assets (denoted as Size). Sizet is 
computed as the average of total assets at the beginning and the end of year t. 
Leverage (denoted as Lev) is measured by average total debt over average total assets. According to 
Jensen (1986), using debt could limit free cash flows in the hands of managers, and thus could help to 
restrict managers’ opportunities for overinvesting and exploiting companies’ resources for their 
private use. In addition, higher leverage could also enhance outside monitoring from debtholders and 
financial markets over management. In addition, firms could also gain from interest tax shields by using 
debt (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973). However, leveraged companies could also face financial distress 
costs and the loss of financial flexibility. Thus, while leverage may impact firm performance, the sign 
of the impact is unpredictable. 
Growth opportunity is proxied by the fixed assets growth rate (denoted as FixAGrR). Fixed assets play 
a crucial role in the manufacturing industry, as they directly reflect companies’ capacity to produce the 
final products. Firms spending more on fixed assets signal better growth opportunities to the market, 
therefore leading to investors’ optimism on the future of the companies. As a result, FixAGrR should 
positively affect Tobin’s Q. However, observations with extremely high growth rates of fixed assets, 
i.e. greater than 1, which could be a potential source of noise in the analysis, are excluded from the 
sample. 
Firm age (denoted as Age) is the number of years companies are listed on the HOSE. Black, de Carvalho, 
Khanna, Kim, and Yurtoglu (2014) stated that younger firms tend to grow faster and have more 
intangible assets, thus resulting in higher Tobin’s Q. Thus, firm age is expected to negatively affect firm 
performance. 
According to the Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM), expected return of stock should be positively 
and linearly correlated with the firm’s market risk (Lintner, 1965; Sharpe, 1964). Meanwhile, as Tobin’s 
Q is a measure of current firm value, it should be a function of expected cash flows and expected 
returns (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Therefore, market risk could be a potential factor affecting Tobin’s 
Q. In this study, market risk (denoted as Beta) is proxied by the beta coefficient obtained from the 
CAPM-type regression of weekly excess stock returns on weekly excess market returns: 
𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑓 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) + 𝜀𝑖 
Where 𝑟𝑓 is the risk free rate which is proxied by the weekly interbank offered rate collected from 
Datastream. 𝑟𝑖 and 𝑟𝑚 are weekly average stock returns and market returns respectively, which are 
calculated based on daily stock prices and the VN-Index obtained from the website 
http://cophieu68.vn. This is a leading financial website providing the most updated financial 
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information and analysis for investors in Vietnam. The VN-Index is employed as the market index 
because of the dominance of the HOSE over the HNX in terms of market capitalization and trading 
volume. In each beta calculation, return sequences are restricted to two years. For example, to 
calculate a firm’s beta in 2010, only weekly returns in 2009 and 2010 are used. The restriction of 
returns to within two years helps to incorporate the most recent information of risks, which is more 
likely to affect firm performance than out-of-date information from further returns. 
Furthermore, nine year dummies for years from 2007 to 2011 are included as independent variables. 
An important assumption of the system-GMM is no correlation across individuals in the idiosyncratic 
disturbances. The inclusion of time dummies makes this assumption more likely to hold (Roodman, 
2009a), and thus increases the validity of the system-GMM in this study. 
Table 3.1. Variable definitions 
Variables Acronyms Definition 
Average 
Tobin’s Q 
AvQ AvQ of year t is the average of firms’ Tobin’s Q at the end of year 
t and year t – 1. Tobin’s Q is computed as the market value of 
equity plus the book value of debt, divided by the book value of 
total assets. 
Managerial 
ownership 
MO Percentage of shares owned by the Board of Directors, 
Supervisory Board and Executive Board 
State 
ownership 
SO Percentage of shares owned by the central government, the 
local government, the SCIC and other SOEs 
Block 
ownership 
BO Percentage of shares owned by blockholders, i.e. who own ≥ 5% 
of total shares. BO = 0 if company does not have any 
blockholders 
Number of 
blockholders 
NoBO Number of shareholders who own at least 5% of total shares 
The largest 
shareholder 
change 
LOChange LOChanget = 1 if the largest shareholder is changed in year t, 0 
otherwise 
Dummy for 
controlling 
shareholders 
CtrlDum CtrlDumt = 1 if there is a controlling shareholder in the company, 
i.e. the shareholder owns ≥ 50% total shares) in year t, 0 
otherwise 
Firm size Size Average of total assets at the beginning and the end of the year 
Leverage Lev Ratio of total debt to total assets 
Growth 
Opportunity 
FixAGrR Fixed assets growth rate 
Market risk Beta Beta coefficient obtained from the CAPM-type regression of 
weekly stock returns on market returns. Market return is 
proxied by the percentage change of the VN-Index 
Firm Age Age Number of years the firm has been listed on the HOSE 
Year dummies D2007-D2015 Nine year dummies for years from 2007 to 2011 
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3.3 Empirical models 
Based on the hypotheses developed in Section 2.4, three separate models (1), (2) and (3) are 
constructed to examine the impacts of managerial ownership, block ownership and state ownership 
on firm performance respectively. To control for the dynamic nature of the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance, which is documented in Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002); Hu 
and Izumida (2008); Thomsen and Pedersen (2000), among others, the first lag of AvQ (AvQit-1) is 
included in the right-hand-side variables. In addition, the quadratic and cubic terms of ownership 
structure are employed to control for the commonly observed non-monotonic relationship.  
𝐴𝑣𝑄𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝜃𝐴𝑣𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑂𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑂𝑖𝑡
3 +  𝛿𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (1) 
𝐴𝑣𝑄𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝜃𝐴𝑣𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑂𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑜𝐵𝑂 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑡𝑟𝑙𝐷𝑢𝑚 + 𝛿𝑍𝑖𝑡 +
𝜑𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡            (2) 
𝐴𝑣𝑄𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝜃𝐴𝑣𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽1𝑆𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑂𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛿𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (3) 
Where 𝑍𝑖𝑡  represents firm characteristics control variables, including firm size (Size), leverage (Lev), 
growth opportunity (FixAGrR), and firm’s market risk (Beta), which are treated as endogenous 
variables in the models. 𝐷𝑖𝑡 includes firm age (Age) and year dummies, which are treated as strictly 
exogenous. Such treatments are based on Wintoki, Linck, and Netter (2012). 𝜂𝑖  denotes firm-level 
unobserved heterogeneity, which is time-invariant within a firm but varies across different firms; 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is 
the idiosyncratic error term. 
Since block ownership and managerial ownership are two distinct measures of ownership 
concentration, it is worth to include both in one unified model to examine one’s effects on firm 
performance while controlling for the other. Therefore, model (4) is constructed as a combination of 
models (1) and (2). 
𝐴𝑣𝑄𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝜃𝐴𝑣𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑂𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑂𝑖𝑡
3 + 𝛽4𝐵𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑂𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽6𝑁𝑜𝐵𝑂 +
𝛽7𝐿𝑂𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑡𝑟𝑙𝐷𝑢𝑚 +  𝛿𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡       (4) 
3.4 Endogeneity of ownership structure 
Currently, it is widely agreed that endogeneity should be controlled for in examining the relationship 
between ownership structure and firm performance. In a statistical model, the endogeneity arises 
when an independent variable is correlated with the error term. Specifically, if any of the ownership 
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structure variables as well as other control variables correlates with the overall error term (𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡), 
the models could suffer from the endogeneity problem. 
Demsetz (1983) argued that the firm’s current ownership structure resulted from interactions of 
decisions of various owners in the value maximizing process. Allowing possible on-the-job 
consumption of manager positions, the shareholders’ decisions to buy a certain number of shares, as 
well as to become managers themselves or to hire professional managers, depend on which choices 
could reward them with the highest utility. Supporting this view, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) stated that 
during the decision making process, firm owners have already been aware of possible consequences 
of losing control over managers, as well as associated offsetting benefits such as lower capital 
acquisition cost, economies of scale and managerial specialization. Thus, if shareholders choose a 
dispersed ownership structure, they have rationally expected the benefits to be able to offset the costs 
to ensure the ultimate goal of value maximization. Obviously, these arguments focus on expected firm 
performance, which is usually measured by Tobin’s Q. But backward-looking performance (i.e. 
accounting profit) is a strong indicator that forms the forward-looking Tobin’s Q, because investors 
always take into consideration past information to form their expectation on the future profitability of 
firms. As a result of the process, firm performance, regardless of whether it is backward-looking or 
forward-looking, is expected to have no systematic relationship with ownership structure (Demsetz & 
Villalonga, 2001). 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) stated that a source of endogenous ownership structure could be 
simultaneity. While ownership structure could affect firm performance, it is likely that firm 
performance could also affect ownership structure, particularly managerial ownership. Information 
asymmetry creates divergences in firm performance expectations between insiders (i.e. managers) 
and outside shareholders, allowing managers to vary their holding of stocks based on their own 
expectations. An extreme example is leverage buyout, in which non-management shares are 
significantly purchased by managers who can access inside information and therefore, have distinct 
expectations about prospective firm performance compared to outside shareholders. On the other 
hand, stock option compensation for managers is another typical example in which firm performance 
can affect managerial ownership. Thus, firm performance and ownership structure could be jointly 
determined. 
However, it should be noted that assumptions under these arguments include an efficient market, in 
which investors are well informed (or at least well signaled by the market), shares are freely traded, 
and the legal protection of minority shareholders and outside shareholders is effective. Thus, under 
less pleasant conditions of transition markets, these arguments seem to be less powerful. This implies 
that the endogeneity of ownership structure is less likely to be as clear as in developed countries. 
38 
 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) proposed that another source of endogeneity of ownership structure could 
be unobserved firm heterogeneities that simultaneously determine both firm performance and 
managerial ownership structure. They pointed out three examples of unobserved heterogeneity, 
including monitoring technology, intangible assets and degree of market power. Obviously, superior 
monitoring technology, high intangible assets and strong market power could positively affect firms’ 
profitability. Meanwhile, firms with better monitoring technology could choose a lower level of 
managerial ownership while still retaining maximizing value. On the other hand, because intangible 
assets are harder to monitor compared to tangible assets and easy to be subjected to managerial 
discretion, firms with a high proportion of intangible assets would call for a higher level of managerial 
ownership in order to align managers’ interest with that of shareholders. It is similar to the case of 
firms with strong market power, since such firms provide favorable conditions for managers to exploit 
shareholders. Himmelberg et al. (1999) stated that if these unobserved firm heterogeneities are not 
well controlled in empirical models, the consequences of omitting variables such as a spurious 
relationship could arise. Pindado and De La Torre (2004) carried out model experiments on the sample 
of 135 Spanish non-financial firms during 1990-1999 and stated that the main source of endogeneity 
is the simultaneity between ownership and firm performance, rather than time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneities. Thus, they suggested that using an IV or Simultaneous Equation Model is more 
appropriate than Fixed Effects in tackling the endogeneity problem. 
3.5 Estimation methods 
In the early stage, the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance was mainly 
estimated by the Ordinary Least Square (OLS), for example Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Morck et al. 
(1988), Palia and Lichtenberg (1999), among others. In the OLS, parameters are linearly estimated by 
minimizing the sum of squares of differences between observed and predicted values of the 
dependent variable. The unbiasedness and consistency of the OLS rely on four key underlying 
assumptions: (i) linear in parameters; (ii) random sampling; (iii) no perfect colinearity; and (iv) zero 
conditional mean. However, the endogenous ownership structure in the relation to firm performance 
violates the assumption (iv), i.e. the error term correlates with the dependent variable, therefore the 
OLS estimates are biased and inconsistent. Therefore, controlling for endogeneity becomes crucial in 
an empirical study of corporate governance in general, and ownership structure in particular. This 
subsection reviews some estimation methods commonly used in previous studies to deal with 
endogeneity, including Fixed Effects, Instrumental Variables and system-GMM.  
3.5.1 Fixed Effects 
Consider model (3.1), which represents the four models proposed in Section 3.3: 
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𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜃𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡  (3.1) 
Where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 and 𝐷𝑖𝑡 represent endogenous and exogenous variables respectively, 𝑒𝑖 denotes error term, 
which includes 𝜂𝑖  (firm-level unobserved heterogeneity which is time-invariant within a firm (at least 
in a short period) but is variant across different firms) and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (idiosyncratic disturbance). As the 
correlation between 𝜂𝑖  and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 could be a source of endogeneity, the Fixed Effects estimator addresses 
the problem by eliminating the effect of 𝜂𝑖. The most common approach is Within Group, which 
transforms the original equation into a mean-deviation form. 
The first step in Within Group is to calculate the average of the panel observations for each individual 
over time, 
?̅?𝑖𝑡 =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑇
1
= ?̅? +  𝜃
1
𝑇 − 1
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𝑇−1
1
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1
+ 𝜑 ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑡
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1
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?̅?𝑖𝑡 = ?̅? + 𝜃?̅?𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽?̅?𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑?̅?𝑖𝑡 + ?̅?𝑖 + 𝜀?̅?𝑡 (3.2) 
Since 𝛼 is the constant, 𝛼 = ?̅?. In addition, the firm-level unobserved heterogeneity 𝜂𝑖  is assumed to 
be unchanged over time (that is why it is called fixed effect), so 𝜂𝑖  should be equal to ?̅?𝑖. Thus, 
subtracting (3.2) from (3.1), we have: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃(𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 − ?̅?𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽(𝑋𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖) + 𝜑(𝐷𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖) + (𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀?̅?𝑡) (3.3) 
As time-invariant factors that correlate with independent variables have been wiped out, the error 
term (𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀?̅?𝑡) in (3.3) now satisfies the assumption (iv). Therefore, the equation (3.3) can be 
estimated by the OLS, which is consistent and converging to the true values as 𝑁 → ∞ (Hill, Griffiths, 
& Lim, 2011). 
Because of the dynamic nature of the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance, it is crucial to include the lagged dependent variable (i.e. 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1) as a regressor. However, 
the inclusion could result in the dynamic endogeneity problem, which could not be eliminated using 
Fixed Effects. Specifically, in the time-demeaning equation (3.3), the error term (𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀?̅?𝑡) = (𝜀𝑖𝑡 −
𝑇−1∑𝑡=1
𝑇 𝜀𝑖𝑡) contains 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1 which in turns correlates positively with the term 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 in (𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 − ?̅?𝑖). 
Consequently, at least one regressor still correlates with the error term, even if fixed effects have been 
driven out. Therefore, the dynamic endogeneity leads to the dynamic panel bias in the Fixed Effects 
(Bond, 2002; Nickell, 1981). 
3.5.2 Two-Stage Least Square 
Another approach to address the endogeneity problem is Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS), which is a 
generalization of the Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator. The main idea of the 2SLS and IV is using 
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exogenous instrumental variables to eliminate the effects of correlation between endogenous 
variables and the error term. For illustration, consider model (3.4), which is a modification of model 
(3.1) where 𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 is included in 𝑋𝑖𝑡, since they are all treated as endogenous in my models. 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡  (3.4) 
Assume that there are 𝑘 variables 𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑘 that are correlated with the error term 𝑒, thus they 
are endogenous. The 2SLS can be conducted if we can find a set of 𝑙 variables 𝑍1, 𝑍2, … , 𝑍𝑙 that (i) do 
not directly affect 𝑌, and thus are not included in the right hand side of (3.4); (ii) are respectively 
correlated with 𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑘; and (iii) uncorrelated with the error term. 𝑍1, 𝑍2, … , 𝑍𝑙 are called 
instrumental variables. A necessary condition for a feasible 2SLS is 𝑙 ≥ 𝑘. If 𝑙 = 𝑘, we will have just 
enough instrumental variables for estimation, and the model parameters are said to be just identified 
or exactly identified. If 𝑙 > 𝑘, then there will be more instrumental variables than necessary, and the 
model is called overidentified. 
The 2SLS, as it is named, consists of two steps of estimation. In the first step, every endogenous variable 
𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑘 is regressed on the set of exogenous variables in the original equation (i.e. 𝐷𝑖𝑡 in (3.1)) 
and the set of instrumental variables 𝑍1, 𝑍2, … , 𝑍𝑙. The 𝑘 equations are: 
𝑋𝑗 = 𝜇𝑗 + 𝜔𝑗𝐷 + 𝛾1𝑗𝑍1 + 𝛾2𝑗𝑍2 + ⋯ + 𝛾𝑙𝑗𝑍𝑙 + 𝑣𝑗 (3.5) 
where 𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝑘. 
Since all variables on the right hand side are exogenous, equation (3.5) can be estimated by the OLS 
and then the predicted values of each endogenous variable are obtained: 
?̂?𝑗 = ?̂?𝑗 + ?̂?𝑗𝐷 + 𝛾1𝑗𝑍1 + 𝛾2𝑗𝑍2 + ⋯ + 𝛾𝑙𝑗𝑍𝑙 + 𝑣𝑗    
Where 𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝑘 and ?̂?𝑗, ?̂?𝑗, 𝛾1𝑗, 𝛾2𝑗, … , 𝛾𝑙𝑗, 𝑣𝑗 are estimated values of 𝜇𝑗, 𝜔𝑗, 𝛾1𝑗, 𝛾2𝑗, … , 𝛾𝑙𝑗, 𝑣𝑗 
from equation (3.5). 
In the second step of estimation, the OLS is once again applied to get the estimated values of 𝛽𝑗: 
𝑌 = 𝛼 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗?̂?𝑗 + 𝜑𝐷 + 𝑒      𝑗 = 1, 2, … , 𝑘. 
Although 2SLS and IV are usually used to mitigate the simultaneity problem, i.e. ownership structure 
and firm performance are antecedents of each other, they are not designed to deal with the dynamic 
endogeneity (Nguyen et al., 2015). Furthermore, it is noteworthy that a crucial requirement of the 
validity of the 2SLS and IV is that the instrumental variables must be strong, i.e. they are strongly 
correlated with endogenous explanatory variables. In the case of weak instruments, the estimators 
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can suffer from large bias and standard errors, and their large sample distribution may not be 
approximately normal (Hill et al., 2011). However, strong external instrumental variables for ownership 
structure are normally very hard to find in practice, as any variable that possibly affects ownership 
structure could also affect firm performance (Himmelberg et al., 1999). This leads to the use of 
internally-generated instrumental variables, which will be described in the subsequent section. 
3.5.3 Generalized Method of Moments 
Difference-GMM versus system-GMM 
Given the above-mentioned drawbacks of Fixed Effects and 2SLS, two other estimation techniques 
have been developed to better control for all possible sources of endogeneity in the dynamic firm 
performance – ownership structure model, including the difference-GMM proposed by Holtz-Eakin, 
Newey, and Rosen (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991), and the system-GMM developed by Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). 
The difference-GMM firstly wipes out time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity by taking the first 
difference of each variable; then using lags of 2 or longer of regressors as instrumental variables 
because they should be orthogonal to the error in the first-differenced equation (Roodman, 2009a). 
Therefore, the difference-GMM is able to eliminate the dynamic panel bias, which is not completely 
controlled in the Fixed Effects. However, the difference-GMM could suffer severely from finite sample 
biases under weak instruments. The problem is even more likely to occur in highly persistent series. 
Fortunately, these biases can be reduced significantly in the system-GMM, which is also more efficient 
than the difference-GMM (Blundell & Bond, 1998). Since the sample is relatively small (76 companies 
with 406 firm-year observations), and ownership structure only changed slightly overtime, the 
application of system-GMM is more appropriate. In addition to the first-differenced equation, the 
system-GMM employs additional moment restrictions by including the level equation with instruments 
as lagged differences of variables. On one hand, the system-GMM can exploit the use of internally-
generated instrumental variables. Therefore, it can overcome the drawback of 2SLS and IV that require 
strict external instrumental variables. On the other hand, similar to the Fixed Effects, the firm level 
unobserved heterogeneity is eliminated in the first-differenced equation. In addition, instruments are 
transformed by taking differences to make them exogenous to the fixed effects in the level equation. 
It could improve efficiency of the estimation since the better controlling for the dynamic panel bias 
(Blundell & Bond, 1998). 
In this study, following Wintoki et al. (2012), except for firm age and year dummies that are obviously 
strictly exogenous, all other independent variables are treated as endogenous. On the other hand, as 
the first lag of the dependent variable (AvQit-1) is included in the dynamic models, lags of two periods 
or more could be used as instruments in the system-GMM. Specifically, similar to De Miguel et al. 
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(2004), this study employs lags of 2 to 4 of level variables as instruments in the first differenced 
equations, and lag 1 of differenced variables as instruments in the level equation. On the other hand, 
the choice between one-step and two-step system-GMM should also be considered. Arellano and 
Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) stated that although the two-step is asymptotically more 
efficient, it tends to suffer more severely from the downward bias of standard errors. Fortunately, 
Windmeijer (2005) has developed a procedure that is able to greatly mitigate the problem, making 
two-step robust more popular recently. Therefore, the two-step robust system-GMM estimator is 
employed in the analysis. To conduct the estimation, this study uses xtabond2 package on Stata written 
by Roodman (2009a). Implementation of the system-GMM estimation for each model is described in 
Appendix B. 
Validity of system-GMM estimations 
The validity of the system-GMM strongly depends on the strength of instrumental variables. A crucial 
requirement is exogeneity, which ensures consistency of the estimations. The exogeneity can be 
assessed by the Sargan or Hansen over-identifying restrictions tests, under the null hypothesis that 
instruments as a group are exogenous. The test statistics follow Chi-squared distribution with degrees 
of freedom equaling the difference between the number of moment conditions and number of 
parameters. While the Hansen test is more robust than the Sargan test to heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation, it is significantly weakened by instrument proliferation. However, as can be seen from 
all results in the next sections, the number of instruments is well kept to be smaller than the number 
of groups as suggested by Roodman (2009b). Therefore, the Hansen test is reasonably employed in 
this study. 
While the Hansen test examines the endogeneity of instruments as a group, the validity of subsets of 
instruments could also be examined by the Difference-in-Hansen test. Under the null hypothesis of the 
exogeneity of instrument subset, the test statistic follows Chi-squared distribution with degrees of 
freedom equaling the number of suspect instruments. In this study, instrumental variables are divided 
into two smaller subsets, including IV-style and GMM-style instruments. 
Another condition of valid instruments is no autocorrelation in the first-differenced idiosyncratic 
disturbances ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1. The negative first-order autocorrelation AR(1) is expected, since ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡 
relates to ∆𝜀𝑖𝑡−1 via the shared term 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1; however the evidence is uninformative (Roodman, 2009a). 
Therefore, the test of second-order autocorrelation AR(2) or further should be focused on. This study 
employs the test proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) with the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation, 
which is widely accepted as the standard in testing autocorrelation in GMM. If the nth-order 
autocorrelation does not present, lags of n or further could be utilized as instruments. Since this study 
uses lags of 2 to 4, AR(2) tests must be insignificant to ensure the validity of the models. 
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Table 3.2 presents the rules of thumb for post-estimation specification tests of GMM. The validity of 
system-GMM estimation is assessed through the number of instruments, AR(2), Hansen and 
Difference-in-Hansen tests. The GMM estimation is considered valid if the number of instruments used 
is smaller than the number of group, and results of all other tests are insignificant (i.e. p-values are 
larger than 0.1). 
Table 3.2. Standards of post-estimation specification tests of GMM 
Tests Null hypothesis Standards 
AR(2) No second-order autocorrelation in 
idiosyncratic errors in differences 
Insignificant (p-value > 0.1) 
Hansen test Instruments as a group are 
exogenous 
Insignificant, (p-value > 0.1) 
Difference-in-Hansen tests   
- GMM instruments for levels Instrument subset is exogenous Insignificant (p-value > 0.1) 
- IV Instrument subset is exogenous Insignificant (p-value > 0.1) 
The number of instruments  Smaller than the number of 
groups 
3.6 Summary 
This study uses a sample of 76 manufacturing companies listed on the HOSE during 2007-2015. Based 
on the availability of data, the unbalanced panel data with 406 firm-year observations is constructed. 
Tobin’s Q is employed as the proxy for firm performance. Besides ownership structure variables 
including managerial ownership, block ownership and state ownership, firm characteristics including 
firm size (Size), leverage (Lev), growth opportunity (FixAGrR), firm’s market risk (Beta) and firm age 
(Age) are employed as control variables. 
It is argued that the endogeneity of ownership structure in the relation with firm performance could 
come from firm level unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and/or dynamic endogeneity. Since 
traditional OLS, Fixed Effects and 2SLS are unable to control completely for all those sources of 
endogeneity, the well-developed system-GMM is employed. To assess the validity of the GMM 
estimator, post estimation tests including the Hansen test, the Difference-in-Hansen test and the 
autocorrelation test should be carried out. 
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Chapter 4 
Results and Discussion 
This chapter discusses the empirical results of the relationship between ownership structure and firm 
performance on a sample of manufacturing companies listed on the HOSE. Section 4.1 provides 
preliminary data analyses, including descriptive statistics, frequency and correlation matrix of 
variables, as well as details of ownership structure. In Section 4.2, subsection 4.2.1 presents diagnostic 
tests of system-GMM, followed by empirical results of the models (1), (2), (3) and (4) in subsequent 
subsections. Finally, a summary of the chapter is provided in Section 4.3. 
4.1 Descriptive Data 
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 describe the characteristics of the sample used in this study. Overall descriptive 
statistics based on the pooled sample are provided in Table 4.1. Because firms with more observations 
are dominant in terms of frequency in unbalanced panel data, it could be misleading to report the 
frequency of firm characteristics in the pooled sample. Instead, variables’ average values are 
calculated, and their frequency is reported in Table 4.2. 
As can be seen in Table 4.1, apart from dummies, most variables’ skewness and kurtosis are 
comparable with those of the normal distribution (i.e. skewness of 0 and kurtosis of 3) except AvQ and 
Size. Both AvQ and Size are very positively skewed with their respective skewnesses of 3.12 and 3.62. 
On the other hand, their kurtoses are 15.73 and 17.79 respectively, indicating extremely leptokurtic 
distributions of these sequences. 
Firm size (Size) - measured by total assets - varies significantly among companies through time with 
the lower bound of 76 billion VND and the upper bound of 26,624 billion VND. In addition, companies 
with average total assets ranging from 500 to 1,500 billion VND are modal in the samples (55 out of 
76). Similar to total assets, the fluctuation of fixed asset growth rate (FixAGrR) is also considerable. 
Although the overall average of FixAGrR is negligible at 5%, the standard deviation is five times larger 
than the mean (0.25). This indicates that fixed asset growth rate varies significantly among companies, 
even though they all are in the manufacturing industry on the same stock exchange. Strikingly, nearly 
a half (31 out of 76 companies) experience negative yearly average value of FixAGrR. It is possibly a 
consequence of the recent global financial crisis as well as the domestic housing bubble crisis, 
indicating the reduction in investment and thus of future growth opportunities. 
The overall mean of financial leverage is relatively high at 0.49, meaning that on average nearly half of 
total assets was funded by debt. The lowest leveraged firm only borrowed 9% of its total assets, 
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meanwhile the highest reached 94%. Beta coefficients - the proxy of market risk - are very small with 
the mean of 0.25 and the maximum of 0.86. Interestingly, the majority of the sample (73 out of 76 
firms, accounting for 96.05%) witnessed annual betas of less than 0.5, of which one is negative. These 
statistics imply the low market risk of the manufacturing sector, which is consistent with the rationale 
of choosing manufacturing companies discussed in Section 3.1. 
Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
AvQ 406 0.45 4.88 1.15 0.58 3.12 15.73 
MO 406 0.00 0.66 0.15 0.18 1.18 3.15 
BO 405 0.00 0.89 0.54 0.17 -0.40 3.26 
SO 406 0.00 0.84 0.20 0.24 0.78 2.24 
NoBO 380 0.00 8.00 2.54 1.44 0.90 3.70 
LOChange 313 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.32 2.37 6.59 
CtrlDum 406 0.00 1.00 0.39 0.49 0.43 1.19 
Size (billion VND) 406 76 26,624 2,271 3,819 3.62 17.79 
Lev 406 0.09 0.94 0.49 0.20 -0.10 2.06 
FixAGrR 384 -0.96 0.99 0.05 0.25 0.96 5.75 
Beta 401 -0.09 0.86 0.27 0.18 0.62 2.79 
Age 406 2.00 15.00 5.28 2.49 0.81 3.74 
The negligible mean of LOChange (0.12) implies high retention of the largest owner through time. For 
example, of 67 companies which released data of LOChange in 2014, only eight witnessed a change of 
the largest shareholder. On the other hand, the mean of CtrlDum is moderate at 0.39, indicating that 
there are slightly fewer observations with controlling shareholders than those without. The number of 
blockholders ranges from 0 to 8 with relatively small mean and standard deviation (2.54 and 1.44 
respectively), reflecting high ownership concentration, i.e. a large portion of stocks is owned by only a 
few shareholders. Significantly concentrated ownership is also indicated by very high averages of 
managerial ownership (MO) and block ownership (BO), namely 15% and 54% respectively. However, 
managerial ownership varies much more than block ownership, indicating that managers could be 
either blockholders or minority shareholders. The level of concentration is dissimilar among companies 
as indicated by a wide range of block ownership and managerial ownership, 0% - 89% and 0% - 66% 
respectively. Regarding frequency in Table 4.2, the modal range of yearly average managerial 
ownership is 0%-5% (35 companies). Meanwhile only four firms have the managerial ownership of 
more than 50%, implying that managers are not usually companies’ controlling shareholders. In 
contrast, 52 of 76 companies have block ownership of more than 50%, and 23 range from 20% to 50%, 
confirming the significantly concentrated ownership structure observed in Table 4.1. 
On the other hand, although the overall average of state ownership is at a moderate level of 20%, the 
series varies significantly (ranging from 0% to 84% with a standard deviation of 0.24) as illustrated in 
46 
 
Table 4.1. This reflects the fact that once state ownership exists in a company, it is normally extremely 
high. For example, while state owners do not present in 36 out of 76 companies, they hold at least 20% 
of total shares in most of the others (28 companies). State owners are the controlling shareholders in 
17 companies (22.37%), indicating a potentially significant influence of the state on companies’ 
activities (see Table 4.2). 
Table 4.2. Frequency of variables 
Characteristics Frequency Percent Characteristics Frequency Percent 
Age 76  Managerial ownership 76  
1 - 5 30 39.47% 0% 0 0.00% 
5 - 10 43 56.58% 0% - 5% 35 46.05% 
10 - 15 3 3.95% 5% - 10% 7 9.21% 
Total Assets 76  10% - 20% 11 14.47% 
≤ 200 3 3.95% 20% - 50% 19 25.00% 
200 - 500 11 14.47% > 50% 4 5.26% 
500 - 1000 25 32.89% Block ownership 76  
1000 - 5000 30 39.47% ≤ 10% 0 0.00% 
5000 - 10000 4 5.26% 10% - 20% 1 1.32% 
>10000 3 3.95% 20% - 50% 23 30.26% 
Leverage 76  > 50% 52 68.42% 
≤ 25% 7 9.21% State ownership 76  
25% - 50% 29 38.16% 0% 36 47.37% 
50% - 75% 33 43.42% 0% - 5% 2 2.63% 
> 75% 7 9.21% 5% - 10% 2 2.63% 
Beta 76  10% - 20% 8 10.53% 
≤ 0 1 1.32% 20% - 50% 11 14.47% 
0 - 0.25 41 53.95% > 50% 17 22.37% 
0.25 - 0.5 31 40.79% Controlling shareholder 76 100.00% 
0.5 - 0.75 3 3.95% Yes 30 39.47% 
> 0.75 0 0.00% No 46 60.53% 
Fixed Assets Growth Rate 76  No. of blockholders 69  
≤ 0 31 40.79% 0 0 0.00% 
0 - 5% 9 11.84% 0 - 4 63 91.30% 
5% - 10% 11 14.47% 4 - 8 6 8.70% 
10% - 20% 14 18.42% The largest owner change 67  
20% - 50% 9 11.84% Yes 8 11.94% 
> 50% 2 2.63% No 59 88.06% 
Tobin's Q 76     
≤ 0.5 0 0.00%    
0.5 - 0.75 7 9.21%    
0.75 - 1.0 32 42.11%    
1.0 - 1.5 29 38.16%    
1.5 - 2.0 5 6.58%    
> 2 3 3.95%    
Yearly average characteristics are calculated as the arithmetic average from the starting year to 2015. The 
starting year depends on the availability of the data of each firm. Because Controlling shareholder and The largest 
owner change are dummy variables, and Age increases by 1 every year, the frequency in 2014 is reported for 
illustration instead of taking the average. Year 2014 is chosen as the data of 76 companies is fully available only 
in this year. “a - b” denotes “larger than a, and smaller than or equal to b”. 
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Regarding firm performance, the overall mean of Tobin’s Q of 1.15 indicates that manufacturing stocks 
were slightly overvalued during the research period. In particular, 61 out of 76 companies (80.26%) 
have the annual average Tobin’s Q from 0.75 to 1.5. Only three firms experienced extremely high 
average Tobin’s Q of more than 2, whilst none observed the low level of Tobin’s Q of smaller than 0.5. 
The correlation matrix of variables used in the four empirical models is presented in Table 4.3. In 
general, all correlation coefficients among independent variables are well under the rule-of-thumb 
value of 0.8 (Gujarati, 2008), indicating a low possibility of the multicollinearity problem9. The largest 
positive correlation coefficient of 0.47 is observed between BO and CtrlDum and is significant at 1%, 
indicating the fact that the presence of the controlling shareholder in a firm significantly increases 
block ownership. In contrast, state ownership (SO) and managerial ownership (MO) present the largest 
negative correlation of -0.51 with the significance level of 1%. It reasonably reflects the fact that 
representatives of state ownership in the management team (mostly in the Board of Directors) of SOEs 
own smaller shares than managers in private companies. Consistent with the entrenchment 
hypothesis, it is likely that since these agents have already represented a large proportion of state 
shares, they do not need to own many private shares but still can entrench their positions, as well as 
maximize private benefits by exploiting firms’ resources. In addition, managerial ownership shows 
strong correlation with the number of blockholders (the coefficient of 0.47 with the significance level 
of 1%). The reason could be that in Vietnamese companies, it is likely that managerial positions, 
especially members of the Board of Directors, are held by blockholders. 
Firm size (Size) is positively correlated with Tobin’s Q at the significance level of 1%. It is reasonable 
because larger firms have many competitive advantages compared to smaller firms, such as financial 
resources, business networks or political connections; therefore they are able to invest in projects that 
small firms are excluded from (Hall & Weiss, 1967). In addition, stocks issued by the larger companies 
are usually considered a safer haven for investors, especially during crises. Therefore, the market may 
assign larger firms higher value than smaller firms. The significant positive correlation between Size 
and SO indicates that larger companies are more likely to be owned by the government. This reflects 
the leading role of SOEs in the Vietnamese market, which is consistent with the Vietnamese 
Constitution. Size and SO, as well as BO, are also negatively associated with the possibility of the largest 
shareholder change (LOChange). Meanwhile, as a result of significant fraction of state shares, state 
ownership is negatively associated with the number of block owners (NoBO), and positively related to 
the presence of the controlling shareholder (CtrlDum).
                                                          
9 The multicollinearity is also checked using variance inflation factors (VIF). The largest VIF is 2.043, which is far 
smaller than 10 – the rule of thumb at which the multicollinearity should be considered a problem (Neter, 
Wasserman, & Kutner, 1989). The VIF results are presented in Appendix C. 
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Table 4.3. Correlation matrix of variables used in the models 
 AvQ MO BO SO NoBO LOChange CtrlDum Size Lev FixAGrR Beta Age 
AvQ 1            
MO -0.25*** 1           
BO 0.06 0.09* 1          
SO 0.29*** -0.51*** 0.24*** 1         
NoBO -0.07 0.42*** 0.17*** -0.34*** 1        
LOChange -0.09 0.01 -0.24*** -0.25*** 0.09* 1       
CtrlDum -0.04 -0.09* 0.47*** 0.34*** -0.30*** -0.13** 1      
Size 0.41*** 0.02 0.05 0.11** -0.07 -0.11* -0.03 1     
Lev -0.29*** 0.15*** 0.09* -0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.24*** 0.02 1    
FixAGrR 0.19*** -0.01 0.02 0.07 0.12** -0.04 -0.10* 0.10* 0.07 1   
Beta 0.38*** -0.21*** -0.23*** 0.15*** -0.10** 0.11* -0.06 0.28*** -0.22*** 0.13** 1  
Age 0.01 -0.25*** 0.16*** 0.01 0.01 -0.07 0.06 0.09* -0.11** -0.06 -0.22*** 1 
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively   
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Intensive details of block ownership are shown in Table 4.4. The percentages of shares owned by the 
first, the second and the third largest blockholders are relatively stable over time in terms of mean, 
median and standard deviation. On average, the largest shareholder owns around 40% of total shares. 
While there is not much difference between shares owned by the 2nd and the 3rd blockholders, the gap 
between the largest ownership and the second is considerable, i.e. nearly three times higher. Thus, it 
is possible that the largest shareholder has superior power in the company, which dominates that of 
other owners. In addition, the average number of blockholders is around 2.5 in all years. These 
statistics indicate that ownership of manufacturing companies on the HOSE is highly concentrated, and 
the majority of shares is in the hands of very few shareholders. Therefore, a significant influence of 
block ownership on firm performance is expected. 
Table 4.4. Breakdown of block ownership 
Mean (median) [standard deviation] 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Pool 
Block 
ownership 
0.43 0.46 0.48 0.47 0.51 0.55 0.57 0.55 0.56 0.54 
(0.35) (0.44) (0.50) (0.46) (0.51) (0.55) (0.56) (0.56) (0.57) (0.55) 
[0.26] [0.21] [0.16] [0.16] [0.15] [0.14] [0.15] [0.19] [0.19] [0.17] 
The largest 
ownership 
0.21 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.38 
(0.09) (0.42) (0.39) (0.38) (0.38) (0.40) (0.43) (0.43) (0.45) (0.40) 
[0.26] [0.19] [0.17] [0.17] [0.16] [0.16] [0.16] [0.19] [0.19] [0.18] 
The 2nd 
largest 
ownership 
0.10 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13 
(0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.12) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
[0.07] [0.08] [0.05] [0.04] [0.06] [0.06] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08] [0.07] 
The 3rd 
largest 
ownership 
0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 
Number of 
blockholders 
4.00 2.17 2.38 2.41 2.48 2.68 2.70 2.55 2.39 2.54 
(3.5) (2) (2) (2) (2) (3) (3) (2) (2) (2) 
[2.16] [1.03] [1.30] [1.05] [1.38] [1.47] [1.53] [1.53] [1.50] [1.44] 
Managerial ownership is further broken down into BOD, Supervisory Board and Executive Board 
ownerships, which are presented in Table 4.5. All three components of managerial ownership vary 
very slightly during the research period with the means of around 14%, 0.2% and 8% respectively. This 
stability could be attributable to at least two reasons. First, in my data, members of management 
teams in most companies are not significantly changed over time. It is likely that managers (especially 
members of the BOD) usually hold a significant number of shares (around 14% on average), which 
allows them to entrench their positions in the companies regardless of their performance. In addition, 
an inactive managerial labor market in the emerging market of Vietnam limits the possibility of finding 
alternatives for current managers. It strengthens the opportunity of entrenchment, leading to the high 
frequency of preservation and reappointment of managerial positions. Second, managers possibly do 
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not engage actively in trading in the stock market. It is likely that they are not professional investors 
who seek profit by buying and selling in the stock market. Instead, they might hold stocks possibly for 
other reasons, for example position entrenchment, companies’ future dividends or private benefit of 
control. The thin trading stock market of Vietnam, which is still very young and immature, could be a 
facilitating condition for managers’ inactive trading. 
Table 4.5. Breakdown of managerial ownership 
Mean (median) [standard deviation] 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Pool 
Managerial 
ownership 
0.08 0.04 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.15 
(0.09) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
[0.05] [0.03] [0.17] [0.18] [0.20] [0.19] [0.18] [0.17] [0.18] [0.18] 
Board of 
Directors 
ownership 
0.08 0.03 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.14 
(0.09) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
[0.05] [0.03] [0.17] [0.18] [0.19] [0.19] [0.18] [0.17] [0.17] [0.17] 
Supervisory 
Board 
ownership 
0.08 0.14 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.20 
(0.03) (0.15) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) 
[0.13] [0.12] [0.40] [0.26] [0.29] [0.69] [0.63] [0.54] [0.70] [0.56] 
Executive 
Board 
ownership 
0.04 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) (0.02) 
[0.06] [0.03] [0.13] [0.13] [0.15] [0.15] [0.13] [0.13] [0.13] [0.13] 
Pure 
Executive 
Manager’s 
ownership 
0.05 0.43 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.72 0.53 0.33 0.39 0.43 
(0.04) (0.12) (0.03) (0.07) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
[0.06] [0.64] [0.69] [0.52] [0.53] [2.93] [1.93] [0.79] [0.93] [1.58] 
Values of Supervisory Board Ownership, Pure Executive Manager’s Ownership are multiplied by 102. 
I also computed the ownership of “pure” executive managers (i.e. Executive Board members who are 
not on the Board of Directors) by subtracting the ownership of Supervisory Board and BOD from the 
managerial ownership. The results in Table 4.5 indicate that the proportion of shares owned by “pure” 
executive managers is very small (around 0.3 – 0.7%), indicating a significantly high level of duality in 
corporate governance structure in Vietnam, i.e. most executive managers are members of the BOD. In 
contrast to the BOD ownership that accounts for an extremely large proportion of total managerial 
ownership, the Supervisory Board ownership is negligible with an average of around 0.2%. Although 
theoretically, the independence of the Supervisory Board allows higher efficiency in supervising the 
activities of the two other Boards, extremely inferior ownership could practically lower its voice in the 
management team in which other members hold powerful dual positions in BOD and Executive Boards. 
In addition, small ownership could also trigger a severe agency problem. These facts raise questions 
about the roles of the Supervisory Board in corporate governance in the context of Vietnam. However, 
because this problem is beyond the scope of this thesis, I leave it to further research. 
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4.2 Empirical Results 
4.2.1 Pre-estimation diagnostic tests 
As the system-GMM is designed to deal with endogeneity, one of the largest challenges in corporate 
governance empirical study, this subsection is to check the presence of endogenous variables in the 
models. In addition, as under heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, the GMM estimator is more 
efficient than the Fixed Effects (Wooldridge, 2001), tests of these problems are also conducted. 
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is carried out to test the endogeneity under the null hypothesis that the 
endogenous regressors can be actually treated as exogenous. The test statistic follows Chi-squared (χ2) 
distribution with the degrees of freedom equaling the number of suspected endogenous variables. 
Following Wintoki et al. (2012), in this study all independent variables in four models (1), (2), (3) and 
(4), except firm age and year dummies, are treated as endogenous in the tests. One-year lagged 
differences of endogenous variables are employed as instruments. The results in Table 4.6 reject the 
null hypothesis in all four models with the significance levels of 5% and 10%. This indicates that these 
regressors as a group should be treated as endogenous. Therefore, the system-GMM should be used 
because of its superiority in terms of consistency compared to the OLS and Fixed Effects. 
Furthermore, Breusch and Pagan’s (1979) test for heteroscedasticity and Wooldridge’s (2002, pp. 282-
283) test for autocorrelation in panel data are conducted. While the Breusch-Pagan test statistic 
follows Chi-squared distribution, the Wooldridge test statistic follows F distribution with the null 
hypotheses of constant variance and no autocorrelation respectively. As can be seen in Table 4.6, all 
test statistics reject the null hypotheses at the 1% level, showing strong evidence for the existence of 
both heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in the sample. This result reinforces the use of system-
GMM as it is more efficient than Fixed Effects under these problems. 
Table 4.6. Pre-estimation diagnostic tests 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, null hypothesis: regressors as a group are exogenous 
Chi-squared χ2(8) = 16.76 χ2(10) = 18.25 χ2(8) = 14.61 χ2(13) = 22.84 
p-value 0.0330 0.05083 0.06718 0.04359 
Breusch-Pagan test, null hypothesis: homoscedasticity 
Chi-squared χ2(16) = 377.12 χ2(18) = 378.21 χ2(16) = 352.27 χ2(21) = 367.8 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Wooldridge test, null hypothesis: no autocorrelation 
F statistic F(1, 59) = 96.485 F(1, 56) = 80.946 F(1, 59) = 86.835 F(1, 56) = 89.983 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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4.2.2 Ownership concentration and firm performance 
In order to examine the effects of ownership concentration on firm performance, the models (1), (2) 
and (4) are run using the two-step robust system-GMM, which is well-developed to better control for 
the endogeneity problem. However, as OLS and Fixed Effects are usually employed in empirical 
investigations on the ownership structure – performance relationship, results from those two 
estimations are also reported to facilitate the comparison between this study and previous ones. 
To verify the validity of the system-GMM in models (1), (2) and (4), post-estimation tests are conducted 
and reported in Table 4.7. AR(1) tests’ z-statistics are negative in all three models, indicating the 
possible presence of the negative first-order autocorrelation among idiosyncratic disturbances in 
differences. The negative first-order autocorrelation is statistically significant as expected in model (1) 
and (4), but insignificant in model (2). However, the results of AR(1) test are not used to test the validity 
of system-GMM (Roodman, 2009a). Meanwhile, all z-statistics of the AR(2) tests in three models (1), 
(2) and (4) are insignificant (p-values are 0.223, 0.152 and 0.190 respectively). Therefore it is not 
possible to reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation of idiosyncratic disturbance 
in differences, indicating the nonexistence of the first-order autocorrelation in their levels. Thus, lags 
from two periods in levels could be employed as instruments in the differenced equation (Roodman, 
2009a). In other words, the results support the choice of lags from 2 to 4 as instruments in this study. 
Table 4.7. Post-estimation specification tests of system-GMM in ownership concentration models 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (4) 
AR(1) in first differences (p-value) -2.18** (0.029) -1.38 (0.166) -2.07* (0.097) 
AR(2) in first differences (p-value) -1.22 (0.223) -1.43 (0.152) -1.54 (0.190) 
Number of instruments 41 49 61 
Number of groups 76 69 69 
Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions 
𝜒2(22) = 24.63 
Prob > 𝜒2 = 0.315 
𝜒2(28) = 35.6 
Prob > 𝜒2 = 0.153 
𝜒2(37) = 37.17 
Prob > 𝜒2 = 0.461 
Difference-in-Hansen tests (p-value)    
- GMM instruments for levels 0.314 0.654 0.465 
- IV 0.692 0.748 0.966 
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. p-values are in parentheses. 
On the other hand, the Hansen tests of over-identification reveal the J-statistics of 24.63 (p-value = 
0.315), 35.6 (p-value = 0.153) and 37.17 (p-value = 0.461) in models (1), (2) and (4) respectively. The 
larger-than-0.1 p-values indicate that the null hypothesis of the enxogeneity of all instruments as a 
group can be accepted. Furthermore, to test the exogeneity of instrument subsets, i.e. GMM-style 
instruments for levels and IV-style instruments, the Difference-in-Hansen tests are conducted. All p-
values of the Difference-in-Hansen test statistics in three models are insignificant, therefore there is 
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no evidence to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. So, the results of both the Hansen test and the 
Difference-in-Hansen test support the exogeneity of instrumental variables used in the three models. 
Such exogeneity is a crucial characteristic of good instruments. In addition, the number of instruments 
is kept smaller than the number of groups as recommended by Roodman (2009a). Therefore, possible 
consequences of too many instruments are more likely to be avoided. In sum, all post-estimation 
specification tests strongly support the validity of the system-GMM models. Therefore, I will mainly 
focus on system-GMM results in subsequent discussions. 
Table 4.8 reports the results of model (1) on the sample of 76 manufacturing companies during the 
period of 2007-2015, using the OLS, Fixed Effects and system-GMM. All F-statistics of those estimations 
are highly significant at the 1% level. Thus, the joint null hypothesis that all estimated coefficients 
(except the constant) are jointly equal to zero is rejected. In other words, at least one of parameters 
in each model is non-zero, indicating the overall significance of the models (Hill et al., 2011). In 
addition, high values of R2 (90.14% in the OLS, 73.34% in the Fixed Effects) indicate strong explaining 
power of regressors on dependent variables. R2 is not applicable in the case of the system-GMM. 
Table 4.8. The effect of managerial ownership on firm performance 
 OLS Fixed Effects System-GMM 
AvQit-1 0.9213* 
(35.91) 
0.4662*** 
(8.86) 
0.9430*** 
(5.30) 
MO 0.8569* 
(1.68) 
0.5433 
(0.49) 
4.6452* 
(1.95) 
MO2 -4.4830* 
(-1.90) 
-3.2653 
(-0.69) 
-23.3558* 
(-1.93) 
MO3 5.2157* 
(1.89) 
5.2872 
(0.96) 
27.2801* 
(1.85) 
Size 0.0113*** 
(3.32) 
0.0583*** 
(6.9) 
0.0180 
(0.65) 
Lev -0.0508 
(-0.89) 
-0.2005 
(-1.44) 
-0.3108 
(-0.85) 
FixAGrR 0.0544 
(1.27) 
0.1140** 
(2.49) 
-0.3381** 
(-2.2) 
Beta -0.1213 
(-1.11) 
-0.1597 
(-1.18) 
0.2108 
(0.77) 
Age 0.0107** 
(1.99) 
0.0188 
(1.09) 
-0.0039 
(-0.37) 
R2 90.14% 73.34%  
F-statistic F( 16, 298) = 170.30 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
F(15, 224) = 24.47 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
F(18, 75) = 200.38 
Prob > F = 0.000 
Number of observations 315 315 315 
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. t-statistics are in parentheses. Year 
dummies and constants are included but unreported. 
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Regression coefficients of AvQit-1 are significant at the 1% level in all three estimations. In addition, the 
magnitude of coefficients in the OLS and system-GMM is considerably high, namely 0.92 and 0.94 
respectively. This indicates a strong impact of past performance on current performance, and thus the 
robustness of the dynamic models against traditional static models.  
The results from the OLS show the cubic relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance, i.e. 𝛽1 and 𝛽3 are positive, while 𝛽2 is negative. With t-statistics of 1.68, -1.90 and 1.89 
respectively, these three coefficients are fairly significant at the 10% level. After wiping out unobserved 
heterogeneity in Fixed Effects estimations, coefficients’ signs are the same, but they become 
insignificant. When endogeneity is controlled better in the system-GMM estimator, signs remain 
unchanged, however there are slight improvements in t-statistics compared to those of OLS, namely 
1.95, -1.93 and 1.85. Therefore, the hypothesis H1 is accepted. The observed cubic relationship can be 
explained by both convergence-of-interest and entrenchment hypotheses, and is consistent with the 
findings of Morck et al. (1988) in the U.S., Short and Keasey (1999) in the UK and De Miguel et al. (2004) 
in Spain.  
By taking the partial derivative of model (1) with respect to MO, I calculate two turning points of the 
cubic relationship using the following formula: 
- The first turning point (local minimum): 𝑀𝑂1 = (−2𝛽2 − √4𝛽2
2 − 12𝛽1𝛽3) 6𝛽3⁄  
(4.1) 
- The second turning point (local maximum): 𝑀𝑂2 = (−2𝛽2 + √4𝛽2
2 − 12𝛽1𝛽3) 6𝛽3⁄ . 
After substituting estimated values of 𝛽1, 𝛽2 and 𝛽3, results from both OLS and system-GMM 
estimations show the turning points of around 12% and 45%. This indicates that if managerial 
ownership ranges from 0% to 12% or is larger than 45%, any increase in managerial ownership will lead 
to higher firm performance, ceteris paribus. At a low level of ownership, it is likely that managers have 
little power to entrench their positions, therefore their future in the company strongly depends on 
how well the company performs. Therefore, the entrenchment effect could be negligible at this level 
of managerial ownership. As a result, managers have more incentives to operate the company more 
effectively. At the 12% - 45% range, it seems that their power is large enough to ignore any monitoring 
mechanism and to gain private benefit of control. Thus, instead of maximizing firm value, managers 
have incentives to exploit other owners for their own self-benefits. When ownership reaches 45%, 
although managers even have higher ability to entrench their positions, their benefit becomes 
asymptotically identical to that of the company as a whole, making the exploitation of firm resources 
less attractive. Therefore, the increase in ownership will translate into higher incentives to maximize 
the firm value. 
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Interestingly, managers in manufacturing companies on the HOSE become entrenched at similar levels 
of ownership as those of UK companies, which witness the turning points of 15% and 42% (Short & 
Keasey, 1999). Because it is naive to jump to the conclusion that the corporate governance 
effectiveness in Vietnam and in the UK is similar, I propose that while there are some typical conditions 
in Vietnam reducing the level of ownership at which managers get entrenched, there are others 
favoring it. It is likely that a considerably high level of ownership concentration with powerful influence 
in the hands of only a few blockholders allows them to dismiss managerial positions easily; thus if 
managers want to protect their positions, they must acquire a high level of ownership. Another 
possible favoring condition is that in Vietnam, the General Meeting of Shareholders usually prefers to 
appoint large shareholders to be managers, especially BOD members. Regarding hindering conditions, 
the inactive managerial labor market in Vietnam is a barrier for the General Meeting of Shareholders 
to dismissing current managers and appointing others. This lowers the required level of managerial 
ownership for entrenchment. Another hindering condition could be poor monitoring and failure to 
respond to bad management from outside shareholders, which are usually observed in emerging 
markets with the dominance of uninformed investors (Jackson & Hoepner, 2001). As a result, managers 
have more freedom to act in their own interests without holding significant shares. 
To examine the relationship between block ownership and firm performance, model (2) is run using 
the OLS, Fixed Effects and system-GMM. Results are reported in Table 4.9. Similar to model (1), very 
small p-values of F-tests reveal the strong overall significance of all OLS, Fixed Effects and system-GMM 
estimations. Variations of Tobin’s Q can be explained strongly by independent variables in both OLS 
and Fixed Effects (90.78% and 73.07% respectively). In addition, the impact of past performance on 
current performance is very significant at the 1% level. However, with the regression coefficient of 
0.78, the magnitude of the effect in the system-GMM slightly decreases compared to the result of 0.94 
from model (1).  
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Table 4.9. The effect of block ownership on firm performance 
 OLS Fixed Effects System-GMM 
L.AvQ 0.9218*** 
(35.56) 
0.4698*** 
(9.01) 
0.7779*** 
(4.56) 
BO 0.0328 
(0.11) 
-0.4956 
(-1.24) 
0.0806 
(0.10) 
BO2 -0.0471 
(-0.18) 
0.6979* 
(1.85) 
-0.1481 
(-0.20) 
NoBO 0.0017 
(0.17) 
0.0188 
(1.03) 
0.0132 
(0.24) 
LOChange 0.0200 
(0.20) 
-0.0003 
(-0.01) 
-0.0003 
(0.00) 
CtrlDum 0.0080 
(0.26) 
0.0743 
(1.08) 
0.0528 
(0.42) 
Size 0.0093*** 
(2.80) 
0.0616*** 
(7.44) 
0.0254 
(0.75) 
Lev -0.0846 
(-1.36) 
-0.2285 
(-1.63) 
-0.2038 
(-0.69) 
FixAGrR 0.0689 
(1.52) 
0.1313*** 
(2.90) 
-0.1001 
(-0.69) 
Beta -0.0710 
(-0.64) 
-0.0453 
(-0.32) 
0.1243 
(0.44) 
Age 0.0093* 
(1.82) 
-0.0169 
(-0.90) 
0.0072 
(0.70) 
R2 90.78% 73.07%  
F-statistic F( 18, 277) = 151.61 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
F(17,210) = 24.48 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
F(20, 68) = 20.39 
Prob > F = 0.000 
Number of observations 296 296 296 
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. t-statistics are in parentheses. Year 
dummies and constants are included but unreported. 
The positive sign of 𝛽1 and the negative sign of 𝛽2 are observed in both OLS and system-GMM, 
indicating that block ownership could impact positively on firm performance at low levels (due to the 
monitoring effect), and negatively at higher levels (due to the expropriation effect). This is contrary to 
the result in Fixed Effects that indicates a U-shaped relationship between the fraction of shares owned 
by blockholders and Tobin’s Q. However, very small t-statistics of 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 corresponding with high 
p-values in all OLS, Fixed Effects and system-GMM estimations do not allow the rejection of the null 
hypotheses of zero coefficients. Thus, from the models there is no supporting evidence for the 
expected hump-shaped relationship between block ownership and firm performance. Therefore, the 
hypothesis H2 is rejected. This finding is in line with McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) in the U.S., Welch (2003) in Australia, Shah and Hussain (2012) in Pakistan. Similarly, 
coefficients of other firm characteristics related to block ownership, including NoBO, LOChange and 
CtrlDum, are insignificant in terms of both magnitude and t-statistic.  
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Model (4) examines the effects of either block ownership or managerial ownership on Tobin’s Q while 
controlling for the other. The results are reported in Table 4.10. Similar to the results in nested models 
(1) and (2), the significance levels of F-statistics in all three estimations are smaller than 1%, implying 
the overall significance of model (4). R2 is also comparable to that of models (1) and (2), namely 90.99% 
in OLS and 70.07% in Fixed Effects. 
Table 4.10. The effect of block ownership and managerial ownership on firm performance 
 OLS Fixed Effects System GMM 
L.AvQ 0.9186*** 
(33.4) 
0.4714*** 
(8.99) 
0.8618*** 
(5.42) 
MO 0.9978* 
(1.76) 
0.5057 
(0.39) 
3.1031** 
(2.09) 
MO2 -5.4581** 
(-2.16) 
-2.0028 
(-0.39) 
-17.1888** 
(-2.27) 
MO3 6.4254** 
(2.19) 
3.1586 
(0.54) 
20.8641** 
(2.17) 
BO 0.0619 
(0.22) 
-0.6932 
(-1.39) 
0.5375 
(0.82) 
BO2 -0.0638 
(-0.23) 
0.8566* 
(1.88) 
-0.5321 
(-0.92) 
NoBO 0.0076 
(0.76) 
0.0191 
(1.02) 
-0.0107 
(-0.24) 
LOChange 0.0026 
(0.07) 
0.0065 
(0.17) 
0.0077 
(0.10) 
CtrlDum 0.0057 
(0.19) 
0.0459 
(0.61) 
-0.0309 
(-0.28) 
Size 0.0120*** 
(3.37) 
0.0609 
(0.31) 
0.0213 
(0.93) 
Lev -0.0749 
(-1.22) 
-0.2426* 
(-1.72) 
-0.2430 
(-0.91) 
FixAGrR 0.0567 
(1.25) 
0.1243*** 
(2.67) 
-0.1717 
(-1.29) 
Beta -0.1257 
(-1.07) 
-0.0590 
(-0.41) 
-0.0777 
(-0.23) 
Age 0.0077 
(1.34) 
-0.0143 
(-0.76) 
-0.0024 
(-0.31) 
R2 90.99% 70.07%  
F-statistic F( 21, 274) =  131.84 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
F(20, 207) = 20.81 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
F(23, 68) = 20.68 
Prob > F = 0.000 
Number of observations 296 296 296 
 *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. t-statistics are in parentheses. Year 
dummies and constants are included but unreported. 
In general, the signs and significance levels of estimated parameters in Table 4.10 are similar to those 
in Table 4.8 and Table 4.9. Interestingly, after controlling for block ownership, the significance levels 
of managerial ownership variables (MO, MO2 and MO3) are all improved to 5%, compared to mostly 
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10% in model (1). Meanwhile, the turning points of the minimum and maximum impacts of managerial 
ownership are unchanged at 12% and 45% respectively. In other words, controlling for possible 
impacts of blockholders on managers does not affect the relationship between insider ownership and 
firm performance. On the other hand, after controlling for managerial ownership, most signs of 
regression coefficients of all block-ownership-related variables are unchanged and remain 
insignificant. The results reinforce the acceptance of the hypothesis H1 and the rejection of the 
hypothesis H2. The findings on one hand imply the trivial role of blockholders in corporate governance; 
on the other hand they indicate the importance of incentive alignment between managers and outside 
shareholders in firm performance improvement. 
In an attempt to explain the insignificant relationship between block ownership and firm performance, 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) proposed that given the ultimate goal of maximizing firm value, 
interactions among investors as well as their responses to market for corporate control facets such as 
hostile takeovers, acquisition or management buyouts, will create a suitable ownership structure for 
firms. Therefore, both firm value and ownership structure are results of the value maximizing process 
of investors, thus they are not expected to impact each other. However, the explanation is possibly 
not applicable to Vietnam, because unlike the matured market of the U.S., the Vietnamese stock 
market is still far from an efficient market even in a weak form (Loc, Lanjouw, & Lensink, 2010), and 
the crucial aspects of the market for corporate control are still underdeveloped. Therefore, in the 
context of Vietnam, I suggest that the insignificant role of blockholders in firm performance 
improvement could be explained by some common characteristics of an emerging market, including a 
high level of information asymmetry, weak legal protection of outside shareholders against insiders, 
and an inactive managerial labor market. First, information asymmetry strongly decreases the 
efficiency of monitoring activities as it could hinder the collection of inside information (Myers & 
Majluf, 1984). Of course, once rational investors realize the problem, they could respond by investing 
in other financial instruments that are more transparent. However, it is likely that the immature and 
thin trading financial market in Vietnam is a significant barrier preventing this flight-to-quality. This 
makes the information asymmetry problem less likely to be resolved. Second, weak legal protection 
decreases large shareholders’ incentives to monitor; thus monitoring become less effective (Burkart & 
Panunzi, 2006). Third, in an inactive managerial labor market, it is difficult to find alternatives for 
current inefficient managers (Fama, 1980). Therefore, the influence of blockholders on firm 
management through their voting rights could be decreased significantly. Compounding the issue, as 
revealed in the annual reports of companies in the sample, the majority of blockholders are institutions 
that take part in monitoring via their representatives on the Board of Directors. However, the paradox 
is that once these representatives occupy positions in the management team, their incentives become 
more similar to other managers’ rather than outside shareholders’. Therefore, it is likely that they will 
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take advantage of their powerful positions in the management team to exploit their principals (outside 
blockholders) for private benefits rather than conducting activities that benefit the company as a 
whole. This agency problem also weakens the monitoring mechanisms of blockholders, leading to the 
insignificant role of blockholders in improving firm performance. 
4.2.3 State ownership and firm performance 
The columns 2, 3, 4  of Table 4.12 shows the estimated results of model (3), while the results of the 
post-estimation tests of the system-GMM are reported in the column 2 of Table 4.11. AR(2) test p-
value of 0.093 does not allow the rejection of the null hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation 
among error terms in differences, indicating the validity of the use of lags from two periods as 
instruments. The number of instruments is kept well under the number of groups (37 versus 76). 
Furthermore, results of the Hansen test and the Difference-in-Hansen test indicate the exogeneity of 
instruments as a whole group and subgroups. Thus, the post-estimation test results meet the 
requirements of a valid system-GMM model as specified in Table 3.2. 
Table 4.11. Post-estimation specification tests of system-GMM in the state ownership models 
 Model (3) Model (3’) 
AR(1) (p-value) 0.0129 0.038 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.093 0.124 
Number of instruments 37 41 
Number of groups 76 76 
Hansen test 𝜒2(19) = 21.44 
Prob > 𝜒2 = 0.313 
𝜒2(22) = 21.80 
Prob > 𝜒2 = 0.472 
Difference-in-Hansen tests (p-value)   
- GMM instruments for levels 0.122 0.261 
- IV 0.724 0.393 
Consistent with the models (1), (2) and (4), coefficients of AvQit-1 are positive with a high significance 
level of 1%, implying the validity of the dynamic model. Regarding state ownership variables, the 
results are mixed among OLS, Fixed Effects and system-GMM. In the OLS, the coefficient of SO is 
positive and that of SO2 is negative. Both are significant at the 1% level, supporting the inverted U-
shaped relationship between state ownership and firm performance. However, after controlling for 
endogeneity, the significance is not sustainable in either Fixed Effects or system-GMM. Therefore, the 
expected hump-shaped relationship possibly does not exist in the sample. 
Interestingly, when model (3) is modified by adding the cubic term of SO (i.e. SO3) to come up with 
model (3’), the regression coefficients of all SO, SO2 and SO3 become strongly significant in both Fixed 
Effects and system-GMM. The results are presented in the columns 5, 6, 7 of Table 4.12. 
𝐴𝑣𝑄𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝜃𝐴𝑣𝑄𝑖𝑡−1 +  𝛽1𝑆𝑂𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑂𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑂𝑖𝑡
3 + 𝛿𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (3’) 
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Table 4.12. The relationship between state ownership and firm performance in the full sample 
 Model (3)  Model (3’) 
 
OLS Fixed 
Effects 
System-
GMM 
 OLS Fixed 
Effects 
System-
GMM 
L.AvQ 08851*** 
(31.93) 
0.4723*** 
(9.02) 
0.7692*** 
(4.7) 
 0.8856*** 
(31.44) 
0.4735*** 
(9.11) 
0.8114*** 
(4.62) 
SO 0.4982*** 
(2.90) 
-0.1742 
(-0.37) 
2.0370 
(1.33) 
 0.5187 
(1.50) 
2.1246* 
(1.80) 
4.8685** 
(2.40) 
SO2 -0.7809*** 
(-2.81) 
-0.5476 
(-0.59) 
-3.6895 
(-1.53) 
 -0.8990 
(-0.73) 
-11.2325** 
(-2.19) 
-14.460*** 
(-2.8) 
SO3     0.1070 
(0.10) 
8.6420** 
(2.12) 
9.8967** 
(2.58) 
Size 0.0132*** 
(3.75) 
0.0585*** 
(6.92) 
0.0467* 
(1.72) 
 0.0132*** 
(3.74) 
0.0562*** 
(6.63) 
0.0337* 
(1.78) 
Lev -0.0624 
(-1.11) 
-0.1441 
(-1.01) 
-0.3227 
(-0.88) 
 -0.0620 
(-1.10) 
-0.1286 
(-0.91) 
-0.5424 
(-1.42) 
FixAGrR 0.0642 
(1.51) 
0.1170*** 
(2.61) 
-0.2174 
(-0.78) 
 0.0633 
(1.46) 
0.1136** 
(2.55) 
-0.3509 
(-1.32) 
Beta -0.0803 
(-0.76) 
-0.1536 
(-1.14) 
-0.0938 
(-0.31) 
 -0.0790 
(-0.74) 
-0.1588 
(-1.18) 
0.2781 
(1.41) 
Age 0.0080 
(1.52) 
0.0188 
(1.09) 
-0.0143 
(-0.82) 
 0.0079 
(1.49) 
0.0190 
(1.10) 
-0.0260 
(-1.39) 
F-test        
 F-statistic F( 15, 299) 
= 184.82 
F(14, 225) 
= 26.11 
F(17, 75) = 
13.55 
 F( 16, 298) 
= 172.70 
F(15, 224) 
= 25.04 
F(18, 75) = 
10.52 
 p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
R2 90.26% 69.06%   90.27% 37.67%  
No. of obs. 315 315 315  315 315 315 
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. t-statistics are in parentheses. Year 
dummies and constants are included but unreported. 
When model (3’) is employed, all OLS, Fix Effects and system-GMM estimations result in the same signs 
of regression coefficients of SO (𝛽1), as well as of its square (𝛽2) and cube (𝛽3), i.e. positive 𝛽1 and 𝛽3, 
negative 𝛽2. However these coefficients are insignificant in the OLS even at the 10% level. After wiping 
out time-constant unobserved heterogeneity in the Fixed Effects, all 𝛽1, 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 become significant, 
mostly at the 5% level. In the system-GMM, when both unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity 
are taken into consideration, significance levels even become higher with corresponding t-statistics of 
𝛽1, 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 are 2.4, -2.8 and 2.58 respectively, compared to 1.90, -2.19 and 2.12 in the Fixed Effects. 
In sum, these results indicate the cubic relationship between state ownership and firm performance. 
However, the puzzle is that if the positive relationship exists at a very high level of state ownership, 
why has the Vietnamese government strongly encouraged privatization during recent years? To 
answer this question, the turning points of the relationship are calculated by taking a partial derivative 
of model (3’) with respect to SO, using the formula (4.1). The results show that the second turning 
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point is around 76% in both Fixed Effects and system-GMM estimations. Digging more deeply into the 
sample, there are only 10 observations of 3 companies which reach the state ownership of 76%. Those 
small numbers imply that these observations could be outliers in the sample and possibly are not good 
representatives for companies with extremely high state ownership. When these 10 observations are 
excluded from the sample and model (3) is re-estimated using this outlier-deleted subsample, 
coefficients of SO and SO2 in all OLS, Fixed Effects and system-GMM become consistently significant. 
The results are reported in Table 4.13. 
Table 4.13. The relationship between state ownership and firm performance in the outlier-deleted 
subsample 
 OLS Fixed Effects System GMM 
L.AvQ 0.8845*** 
(31.61) 
0.4754*** 
(9.18) 
0.7860*** 
(5.10) 
SO 0.6421*** 
(2.88) 
1.9366** 
(2.16) 
2.9176* 
(1.95) 
SO2 -1.0879*** 
(-2.66) 
-7.9269*** 
(-2.82) 
-5.6867** 
(-2.34) 
Size 0.0136*** 
(3.72) 
0.0537*** 
(6.26) 
0.0378 
(1.41) 
Lev -0.0551 
(-0.96) 
-0.0957 
(-0.68) 
-0.6462 
(-1.55) 
FixAGrR 0.0581 
(1.30) 
0.1127** 
(2.54) 
-0.1534 
(-0.68) 
Beta -0.0583 
(-0.54) 
-0.1449 
(-1.07) 
0.3187 
(1.03) 
Age 0.0075 
(0.589) 
0.0198 
(1.15) 
-0.0188 
(-1.1) 
R2 90.32% 16.61%  
F-statistic F( 15, 292) = 181.69 
Prob > F = 0.000 
F(14,220) = 27.3 
Prob > F = 0.000 
F(17, 73) = 11.99 
Prob > F = 0.000 
No. of observations 308 308 308 
Post-estimation specification tests of system GMM 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences (p-value) 0.095 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences (p-value) 0.063 
Number of instruments   37 
Number of groups   74 
Hansen test 
 
 𝜒2(19) = 20.33 
Prob > 𝜒2 = 0.375 
Difference-in-Hansen tests (p-value)  
- GMM instruments for levels  0.249 
- IV   0.543 
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. t-statistics are in parentheses. Year 
dummies and constants are included but unreported. 
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As illustrated in the lower part of Table 4.13, all post-estimation specification tests satisfy the criteria 
specified in Table 3.2, thus qualifying the validity of the system-GMM estimator. Regression 
coefficients of SO and SO2 in the OLS and Fixed Effects are very significant, mostly at the 1% level. In 
the system-GMM, t-statistics and corresponding significance levels slightly decrease. In addition, signs 
of these coefficients are consistent, i.e. positive as for SO and negative in respect of SO2. Interestingly, 
by taking the partial derivative of model (3) with respect to SO, results from the system-GMM in both 
the full sample and the outlier-deleted subsample reveal the local maximum of Tobin’s Q at around 
22%. Thus, the outcomes strongly support the presence of the inverted U-shaped relationship between 
state ownership and firm performance, thus confirming the hypothesis H3. 
The positive impact of state ownership on firm performance at low levels implies that the presence of 
a state stockholder could facilitate firm operations. For example, state ownership allows firms to have 
closer relations with the government and politicians, thus facilitating them to get subsidized interest 
rates, government sponsored bailouts or preferential transactions with other SOEs or government 
agencies. Especially in the context of the Vietnamese economy where there is a lack of transparency 
(Smith, Binh, Colvin, & Rab, 2014) and the state business sector is constituted to play the leading role10, 
these advantages become more significant. However, when state ownership exceeds 22% - the 
estimated turning point in the system-GMM - its relationship with firm performance becomes 
negative. It is likely that at higher levels of state ownership, the dual agency problem arising between 
the state and its representatives in companies becomes more severe, since the latter has stronger 
power in the company thanks to the larger state ownership they represent. Therefore, it could be 
easier for them to take advantage of that power to exploit their principals as well as other minority 
owners. Such exploitation may harm the value of the firm as a whole. Compounding the problem, the 
above-mentioned priorities of SOEs now could become facilitating conditions for expropriation, as they 
create favorable exploiting opportunities for the agents. 
The inverted U-shaped relationship between state ownership and Tobin’s Q implies that partial 
privatization is an effective way to improve the firm performance of SOEs. Privatization reduces shares 
owned by the state in the company, therefore it may mitigate the severity of the agency problem, as 
well as increase managers’ incentives through their private shares. In addition, as a part of the shares 
is owned by private investors, privatization attracts monitoring and supervision from the market, which 
could lead to higher efficiency. On the other hand, although the empirical results show that state 
ownership at low levels possibly has a positive impact on firm performance, it does not imply that 
increasing state shares is good for the economy as a whole. State ownership in a particular company 
may assist its own efficiency, but possibly harms that of others as a result of unfair distribution of public 
                                                          
10 Article 51, the Vietnamese Constitution 2013. 
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resources. Furthermore, if every company has a state shareholder, and thus is able to get access to a 
“helping hand” from the government, there will no longer be competitive advantages due to the 
saturation of accessibility to limited favorable resources. Thus, although the results of this study 
support the inverted-U shaped relationship between state ownership and firm performance, we 
should be careful in interpreting the “optimal” level of state ownership at which firms have the highest 
performance. Essentially, it is a comparison among companies with various contemporary levels of 
state ownership, but not a suggestion of an optimal level that every company should attain. 
4.2.4 Impacts of control variables on firm performance 
Table 4.14 summarizes the estimated impacts of control variables, including firm size (Size), leverage 
(Lev), growth opportunity (FixAGrR), market risk (Beta) and firm age (Age), on firm performance 
(Tobin’s Q) in four models (1), (2), (3) and (3’). I do not re-present the results of the model (4) because 
they are very similar to those of the nested models (1) and (2). The Fixed Effects and system-GMM 
estimations are mainly focused on, as they are more powerful than the OLS in controlling for the 
endogeneity problem. 
Table 4.14. The effects of control variables on firm performance 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (3’) 
 Fixed 
Effects 
System-
GMM 
Fixed 
Effects 
System-
GMM 
Fixed 
Effects 
System-
GMM 
Fixed 
Effects 
System-
GMM 
Size 0.0583*** 
(6.9) 
0.0180 
(0.65) 
0.0616*** 
(7.44) 
0.0254 
(0.75) 
0.0585*** 
(6.92) 
0.0467* 
(1.72) 
0.0562*** 
(6.63) 
0.0337* 
(1.78) 
Lev -0.2005 
(-1.44) 
-0.3108 
(-0.85) 
-0.2285 
(-1.63) 
-0.2038 
(-0.69) 
-0.1441 
(-1.01) 
-0.3227 
(-0.88) 
-0.1286 
(-0.91) 
-0.5424 
(-1.42) 
FixAGrR 0.1140** 
(2.49) 
-0.3381** 
(-2.2) 
0.1313*** 
(2.9) 
-0.1001 
(-0.69) 
0.1170*** 
(2.61) 
-0.2174 
(-0.78) 
0.1136** 
(2.55) 
-0.3509 
(-1.32) 
Beta -0.1597 
(-1.18) 
0.2108 
(0.77) 
-0.0453 
(-0.32) 
0.1243 
(0.44) 
-0.1536 
(-1.14) 
-0.0938 
(-0.31) 
-0.1588 
(-1.18) 
0.2781 
(1.41) 
Age 0.0188 
(1.09) 
-0.0039 
(-0.37) 
-0.0169 
(-0.9) 
0.0072 
(0.70) 
0.0188 
(1.09) 
-0.0143 
(-0.82) 
0.0190 
(1.1) 
-0.0260 
(-1.39) 
*, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
The estimated coefficients of Lev are consistently negative in both Fixed Effects and system-GMM in 
all four models, indicating the possible negative impact of debt on firm performance. This implies that 
among manufacturing companies listed on the HOSE, costs associated with financial distress and 
financial flexibility loss probably dominate benefits from the interest tax shield and agency cost 
reduction. However, small t-statistics do not allow the rejection of the null hypothesis of zero 
coefficients. Therefore, the effect of leverage on Tobin’s Q in the sample is not supported. Similarly, 
effects of firm age and market risk are not found in the sample using both Fixed Effects and system-
GMM estimators. 
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Firm size (Size) and growth opportunities (FixAGrR), which are proxied by average total assets and fixed 
assets growth rate respectively, positively affect firm performance in all Fixed Effects estimations at 
highly significance levels (mostly 1%). Although the effect of FixAGrR vanishes in the system-GMM, 
estimated coefficients of Size remain significant at the 10% level in model (3) and model (3’). Therefore, 
the results generally support the positive impact of firm size on performance, which is possibly an 
effect of monopoly power (Hall & Weiss, 1967) and economies of scale (Antoniou et al., 2008). 
4.3 Summary 
Chapter 4 provides a detailed picture of the ownership structure of Vietnamese manufacturing 
companies listed on the HOSE, as well its impacts on firm performance. In these companies, ownership 
structure is very concentrated as a large proportion of shares is in the hands of only a few shareholders 
and managers. In addition, empirical evidence shows a cubic relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance, which is measured by Tobin’s Q. The cubic relationship found is 
consistent with both convergence-of-interest and entrenchment hypotheses. Strikingly, block 
ownership has no impact on firm performance, even after controlling for managerial ownership. The 
results imply the more important role of building internal incentives compared to external monitoring 
mechanisms in corporate governance. On the other hand, state ownership is also significantly high and 
has an inverted U-shaped relationship with firm performance. This indicates possible contributions of 
partial privatization to firm performance improvement in the context of Vietnam. The empirical results 
are visualized in Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1. Summary of the relationships between ownership structure and firm performance 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
The summary of the study is presented in this chapter. Section 5.1 summarizes the main findings. 
Implications from the results are discussed in Section 5.2, followed by limitations and some 
recommendations for further research in Section 5.3. 
5.1 Major findings 
This study examines the impacts of ownership concentration as well as state ownership on firm 
performance in the Vietnamese stock market in a dynamic framework. The sample includes 76 
manufacturing companies listed on the HOSE during 2007-2015, with 406 firm-year observations. 
Instead of the traditional OLS and Fixed Effects, the system-GMM estimator is employed, promising 
greater power in controlling for the widely-accepted endogeneity of ownership structure. To the best 
of my knowledge, no prior study has applied the system-GMM in investigating the effect of state 
ownership on firm performance in Vietnamese companies. Furthermore, this is also the first study 
comprehensively examining firm ownership concentration and its relationship with firm performance 
in the context of Vietnam.  
The descriptive data shows that the ownership structure of the manufacturing companies listed on the 
HOSE is significantly concentrated with an average number of blockholders of 2.5. Average block 
ownership is considerably high at 54%. The largest owner on average holds 40% of total shares, which 
is nearly three times higher than that of the second blockholder; while the gap between the 
ownerships of the second and the third blockholders is small. Meanwhile, managers in general own 
around 15% of firm shares, of which the majority belongs to the Board of Directors. The Supervisory 
Board’s ownership is negligible at about 0.2%. Meanwhile, state ownership varies significantly among 
companies, ranging from 0% to 84%, with the mean of 20%. 
The main empirical findings of this study are summarized in Table 5.1. The outcomes confirm the cubic 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance, which is consistent with both 
entrenchment and convergence-of-interest hypotheses. At low and high levels of managerial 
ownership, the convergence-of-interest effect is dominant over the entrenchment effect, thus any 
increase in insider ownership will translate into higher incentives for managers to operate companies 
more effectively. In contrast, at the middle level, private “selfish” benefits from managerial positions 
dominate benefits from the increase of firm value. As a result, outside shareholders are more likely to 
be exploited as managerial ownership increases. 
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While the impacts of managerial ownership structure on firm performance still persist after controlling 
for block ownership, the relationship between the latter and firm performance is insignificant even 
after controlling for the former. The results imply the trivial role of blockholders in corporate 
governance, even when they actually own a significant proportion of shares. This fact could be 
attributable to the agency problem between institutional blockholders and their representatives in 
management teams, as well as some typical characteristics of an emerging economy like Vietnam, 
including a high level of information asymmetry, weak legal protection of outside shareholders against 
insiders, and an inactive managerial labor market. 
On the other hand, the relationship between state ownership and firm performance is found to be in 
the hump shape. The engagement of the state as a small owner can contribute to firm value, possibly 
because of the “helping hand” from the government. The presence of state shareholders may allow 
firms to easily access advantageous resources such as subsidized interest rates, preferential state 
capital investment or government sponsored bailouts. However, higher state ownership could lead to 
a more severe dual agency problem in SOEs, so it possibly negatively affects firm performance. Thus, 
the results support partial privatization, as it could assist in shifting firm performance toward its peak. 
The empirical models also find a positive impact of firm size on firm performance, although the 
evidence is relatively weak using the system-GMM estimator. It implies that firms possibly gain from 
their monopoly power and economies of scale. Other control variables, including leverage, growth 
opportunities, market risk and firm age generally have insignificant impacts on firm performance, 
especially after controlling for possible sources of endogeneity in the system-GMM. 
Table 5.1. Major findings of the study 
Characteristics Relationship with Tobin’s Q 
Managerial ownership  
Block ownership                         X 
State ownership  
Firm size                   + 
      inverted U-shaped,  + positive linear,           cubic (positive, negative, positive), X no relationship 
5.2 Implications 
The findings of this study have several implications in dealing with the agency problem – one of central 
issues in corporate governance. First, the significant relationship between managerial ownership and 
firm performance implies the important role of aligning the internal incentives of managers to those 
of outside shareholders. For example, companies should consider performance-based compensations 
for managers instead of predetermined salaries and benefits. In addition, managers possibly could be 
chosen from shareholders who accumulatively hold either a significant part or around 10 – 15% of total 
67 
 
shares, given low possibility of conflict of interest. Since at low and high levels, managerial ownership 
has positive impacts on firm performance, the alignment of interest through ownership could be 
applicable at least in the short term, when the managerial labor market in Vietnam is still 
underdeveloped and monitoring mechanisms from outside shareholders are still ineffective. 
Second, since block ownership has no impact on firm performance, instead of increasing equity 
ownership with the hope of obtaining higher influence over the company, shareholders in general and 
blockholders in particular should be involved actively in and monitor closely day-to-day firm 
operations, or in some cases they should engage directly in corporate governance by undertaking 
positions in the management team. Through those, blockholders will be able to reduce the information 
gap between themselves and inside managers, thus mitigating the consequences of information 
asymmetry. However, the threat of expropriation of minority shareholders, the disadvantages of non-
professional management and the effects of managerial ownership should be taken into consideration 
if blockholders are appointed to managerial positions. 
Third, the inverted U-shaped relationship between state ownership and firm performance implies that 
partial privatization could improve the firm value of Vietnamese SOEs. Companies can benefit from 
the transfer of state ownership to private ownership, as such transfer allows closer monitoring and 
supervision from other investors and the market, as well as decreasing the exploitation opportunities 
of state ownership representatives. In addition, public resources that are freed from selling state 
shares could be reinvested and redistributed in more effective ways. 
Finally, some supporting policies should be conducted to improve corporate governance efficiency. 
Market transparency needs to be improved to alleviate the information asymmetry and the agency 
problems. Through this, monitoring mechanisms from outside stakeholders could be enhanced. In 
addition, the managerial labor market should be developed, so companies could benefit from 
professional managers as well as other benefits of the modern corporation model (e.g. limited liability, 
unlimited lifetime, opportunities to raise additional capital (Brealey et al., 2014)). Furthermore, given 
the significant impacts of managerial ownership on firm performance, leveraged buyout (especially 
management buyout) ought to be motivated and monitored by further legislative frameworks. They 
could encourage and facilitate managers to acquire and take control of undervalued companies, then 
boosting their performance afterwards. 
5.3 Limitations and further research 
The first limitation of this study rises from the sample used. As only manufacturing companies listed 
on the HOSE are employed in the analysis, the results may be applicable only to the manufacturing 
sector. Thus, any generalization should be interpreted with caution. In addition, as the release of 
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ownership structure is non-compulsory in the Vietnamese stock market, the data possibly suffers from 
selection bias, i.e. companies that had chosen to publish information might be more transparent and 
better managed, and therefore more efficient. Future research can overcome this limitation by 
expanding the sample to all companies in the Vietnamese stock market, as well as adding data of 
upcoming years. 
Second, this study does not separate managers who are representatives of institutional shareholders 
from those who are not, due to data unavailability. Given equal private shares, larger represented 
shares possibly give the former more power and influence in the company than the latter. Future 
research should take this issue into consideration to provide a more insightful understanding of the 
effects of managerial ownership on firm performance when the data are available. 
Finally, firm performance may be not completely measured by Tobin’s Q (especially in the case of 
SOEs), leading to the measurement error problem. By its definition, Tobin’s Q is only able to measure 
company financial performance, but not the social benefits of SOEs. It is possible that while acting as 
instruments of the government in curing market failures and providing social welfare, some SOEs must 
sacrifice their own profitability. Therefore, failing to incorporate the social effects of SOEs could lead 
to an underestimation of the impacts of state ownership on firm performance. This problem could be 
addressed by considering the additional social performance of companies, which is normally proxied 
by some reported corporate social responsibility indices. Unfortunately, it is an enormous challenge as 
this information is currently unavailable in the Vietnamese stock market. 
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Appendix A 
List of listed manufacturing companies on the HOSE 
No. Sticker Full name 
Manufacture of food products 
1 AAM Mekong Fisheries Joint Stock Company 
2 ABT BenTre Aquaproduct Import and Export Joint Stock Company 
3 ACL Cuulong Fish Joint Stock Company 
4 AGF An Giang Fisheries Import & Export Joint Stock Company 
5 ANV Nam Viet Corporation 
6 ATA Ntaco Corporation 
7 BBC Anvifish Joint Stock Company 
8 BHS Bibica Corporation 
9 CMX Ca Mau Frozen Seafood Processing Import Export Corporation 
10 FMC Sao Ta Foods Joint Stock Company 
11 HVG Hung Vuong Corporation 
12 ICF Investment Commerce Fisheries Corporation 
13 IDI International Development & Investment Corporation 
14 KDC Kinh Do Corporation 
15 LAF Long An Food Processing Export Joint Stock Company 
16 LSS Lam Son Sugar Joint Stock Corporation 
17 NHS Ninh Hoa Sugar Joint Stock Company 
18 SBT Thanh Thanh Cong Tay Ninh Joint Stock Company 
19 SEC Gia Lai Cane Sugar Thermoelectricity Joint Stock Company 
20 TAC Tuong An Vegetable Oil Joint Stock Company 
21 TS4 Seafood Joint Stock Company No4 
22 VCF Vinacafé Biên Hoa Joint Stock Company 
23 VHC Vinh Hoan Corporation 
24 VLF Vinh Long Cereal And Food Import Export Company 
25 VNH Viet Nhat Seafood Corporation 
26 VNM Viet Nam Dairy Products Joint Stock Company 
27 VTF Viet Thang Feed Joint Stock Company 
Manufacture of beverages 
28 SCD Chuong Duong Beverages Joint Stock Company 
Manufacture of textilies 
29 EVE Everpia VietNam Joint Stock Company 
30 KMR Mirae Joint Stock Company 
31 TCM Thanh Cong Textile Garment Investment Trading Joint Stock Company 
Manufacture of wearing apparel 
32 GMC Sai Gon Garment Manufacturing Trade Joint Stock Company 
Manufacture of wood and products of woods and cork (except furniture); manufacture of articles 
of straw and plaiting materials 
33 GDT Duc Thanh Wood Processing Joint Stock Company 
Paper and paper products 
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34 DHC Dong Hai Joint Stock Company of Bentre 
35 HAP Hapaco Group Joint Stock Company 
36 SVI Bien Hoa Packaging Company 
37 VPK Vegetable Oil Packing Joint Stock Company 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 
38 CLC Cat Loi Joint Stock Company 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
39 CSV South Basic Chemicals Joint Stock Company 
40 DCM Petro Viet Nam Ca Mau Fertilizer Joint Stock Company 
41 DPM PetroVietnam Fertilizer and Chemicals Corporation 
42 HAI H.A.I Joint Stock Company 
43 LIX Lix Detergent Joint Stock Company 
44 RDP RangDong Plastic Joint Stock Company 
45 SFG The Southern Fretilizee Joint Stock Company 
46 VFG Viet Nam Fumigation Joint Stock Company 
47 VAF Van Dien Fused Magnesium Phosphate Fertilizer Joint Stock Company 
Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical and botanical products 
48 DCL Cuu Long Pharmaceutical Joint Stock Corporation 
49 DHG DHG Pharmaceutical Joint Stock Company 
50 DMC Domesco Medical Import Export Joint Stock Corporation 
51 IMP Imexpharm Pharmaceutical Joint Stock Company 
52 OPC OPC Pharmaceutical Joint Stock Company 
53 SPM S.P.M Corporation 
54 TRA Traphaco Joint Stock Company 
Manufacture of rubber and plastics products 
55 BMP Binh Minh Plastics Joint Stock Company 
56 BRC Ben Thanh Rubber Joint Stock Company 
57 CSM The Southern Rubber Industry Joint Stock Company 
58 DAG Dong A Plastic Group Joint Stock Company 
59 DRC Da Nang Rubber Joint Stock Company 
60 DTT Do Thanh Technology Corporation 
61 SRC Sao Vang Rubber Joint Stock Company 
62 TPC Tan Dai Hung Plastic Joint Stock Company 
63 TTP Tan Tien Plastic Packaging Joint Stock Company 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
64 CYC Chang Yih Ceramic Joint Stock Company 
65 FCM FECON Mining Joint Stock Company 
66 HT1 Ha Tien 1 Cement Joint Stock Company 
67 HVX Vicem Hai Van Cement Joint Stock Company 
68 LBM Lam Dong Mineral and Building Material Joint Stock Company 
69 TRC Taicera Enterprise Company 
Manufacture of basic metals 
70 HPG Hoa Phat Group Joint Stock Company 
71 NKG Nam Kim Steel Joint Stock Company 
72 POM Pomina Steel Corporation 
73 VIS Viet Nam – Italy Steel Joint Stock Company 
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Manufacture of fabricated metal products (except machinery and equipment) 
74 DTL Dai Thien Loc Corporation 
75 HSG Huu Lien Asia Corporation 
76 MCP My Chau Printing & Packaging Holding Company 
77 NAV Nam Viet Joint Stock Company 
78 SHI Son Ha International Corporation 
Manufacture of computers, electronic and optical products 
79 VTB Viettronics Tan Binh Joint Stock Company 
Manufacture of electrical equipment 
80 CAV Vietnam Electric Cable Corporation 
81 DQC Dien Quang Joint Stock Company 
82 EMC Thu Duc Electro Mechanical Joint Stock Company 
83 PAC Dry Cell and Storage Battery Joint Stock Company 
84 RAL Rangdong Light Source and Vacuum Flask Joint Stock Company 
85 SAM Sacom development and investment corporation 
86 TYA Taya (Vietnam) Electric Wire And Cable Joint Stock Company 
87 VHG Viet - Han Corporation 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
88 TMT TMT Motor Joint Stock Company 
Manufacture of furniture 
89 DLG Duc Long Gia Lai Group Joint Stock Company 
90 GTA Thuan An Wood Processing Joint Stock Company 
91 TTF Truong Thanh Furniture Corporation 
Other Manufacturing 
92 JVC Japan Vietnam Medical Instrument Joint Stock Company 
93 TLG Thien Long Group Corporation 
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 
94 L10 Lilama 10 Joint Stock Company 
95 LM8 Lilama 18 Joint Stock Company 
Source: http://www.hsx.vn/ 
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Appendix B 
Implementation of dynamic system-GMM estimation 
In this study, system-GMM estimation is conducted in Stata (Version 13.1) using the package xtabond2 
written by and explained in Roodman (2009a). The results of models (1), (2), (3) and (4) that are 
presented in Section 4.2 are obtained using following codes: 
Model (1) 
xtabond2 AvQ L.AvQ MO sqMO cubMO Size Lev FixAGrR Beta Age D2007-D2015, gmm(AvQ MO2 
sqMO2 cubMO2  Size Lev FixAGrR Beta, lag(2 4)collapse) iv(Age D2007-D2015) small 
twostep robust 
Model (2) 
xtabond2 AvQ L.AvQ BO sqBO NoBO LOChange CtrlDum Size Lev FixAGrR Beta Age D2007-
D2015, gmm(AvQ BO sqBO NoBO LOChange CtrlDum Size Lev FixAGrR Beta, lag(2 4)collapse) 
iv(Age D2007-D2015) small twostep robust 
Model (3) 
xtabond2 AvQ L.AvQ SO sqSO Size Lev FixAGrR Beta Age D2007-D2015, gmm(AvQ SO sqSO 
Size Lev FixAGrR Beta, lag(2 4)collapse) iv(Age D2007-D2015) small twostep robust 
Model (3’) 
xtabond2 AvQ L.AvQ SO sqSO cubSO Size Lev FixAGrR Beta Age D2007-D2015, gmm(AvQ SO 
sqSO cubSO Size Lev FixAGrR Beta, lag(2 4)collapse) iv(Age D2007-D2015) small twostep 
robust 
Model (4) 
xtabond2 AvQ L.AvQ MO sqMO cubMO BO sqBO NoBO LOChange CtrlDum Size Lev FixAGrR Beta 
Age D2007-D2015, gmm(AvQ MO2 sqMO2 cubMO2 BO sqBO NoBO LOChange CtrlDum Size Lev 
FixAGrR Beta, lag(2 4)collapse) iv(Age D2007-D2015) small twostep robust 
L.AvQ is the lagged dependent variable, which is identical to AvQit-1. As firm age and year dummies are 
assumed to be strictly exogenous, they are included in iv()option to construct ivstyle instruments. 
Meanwhile, other variables are treated as endogenous and incorporated into gmm()command to 
create gmmstyle instruments. lag(2 4)invokes instruments from t-2 to t-4. The collapse option is 
used to prevent instrument proliferation. As my sample is relatively small with 406 firm-year 
observations, small is specified to get corrections for the covariance matrix estimate. robust 
requests corrections for the downward bias of standard errors in twostep estimation.
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Appendix C 
Multicollinearity test using the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t-statistics 
Significance 
level 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
Constant  6.018 0.000   
MO -0.134 -2.162 0.031 0.489 2.043 
BO 0.089 1.547 0.123 0.558 1.792 
SO 0.162 2.738 0.007 0.536 1.865 
NoBO 0.040 0.726 0.469 0.623 1.604 
LOChange -0.004 -0.090 0.928 0.861 1.162 
CtrlDum -0.073 -1.265 0.207 0.553 1.807 
Size 0.403 8.181 0.000 0.769 1.301 
Lev -0.222 -4.675 0.000 0.829 1.207 
FixAGrR 0.112 2.489 0.013 0.917 1.091 
Beta 0.174 3.358 0.001 0.692 1.445 
Age 0.009 0.178 0.859 0.723 1.384 
Dependent variable: AvQ 
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